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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines one company, Michelin, and its relationship to the larger stories of corporate 
and labor history in twentieth-century France.  While much of the larger interest in Michelin is rooted in 
the company’s activity in the first decades of the twentieth century, my thesis looks specifically at the 
moments in which Michelin and its labor came to play an important role in the broader economic and 
social contexts.  Michelin and its workforce drew attention to the firm in an increasingly global context 
through labor disputes of the late 1930s, their behavior during World War II, their contributions to 
postwar economic recovery, and the centralization of the European economy.   
As France was struck by conflicts that included the Popular Front, Nazi occupation, and the battle 
for postwar recovery, Michelin’s corporate presence endured.  Considering the relationship between labor 
and management before, during, and after World War II, we can see clear continuities in management’s 
program to avoid labor conflict through paternalism and in labor’s refusal of this program.  Inflected by 
the collective memory of these traumatizing events, Michelin continued to establish a lasting identity in 
contemporary France, both as a corporation and in its relationship with its workforce that is recognized to 
this day.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
On February 24, 1936, Édouard Michelin, cofounder of the eponymous French 
manufacturing firm, saw the red communist flag rise above his factories for the first time.  Many 
years later, Édouard’s son Guy recalled his father’s reaction to that day.  Guy remembered his 
father’s anger seeing the flag above his factories, recalling that “1936 was terrible” for 
Michelin.1  Would the politics of this moment pass?  Or, was this just the first battle in a long-
term war with organized labor for the French tire manufacturer?   
 The rubber manufacturer based in Clermont-Ferrand, France is a company that has 
withstood the test of time.2  From its origins as a small family manufacturing business in the 
mid-nineteenth century to the multinational corporation it is known as today, Michelin has 
maintained a corporate structure largely defined by its family origins.3  As Michelin grew and 
expanded, their workforce became an increasingly important part of their operations.  By the end 
of the 1920s, Michelin employed roughly 18,000 workers.4  As Michelin expanded throughout 
Europe and to North America in the years covered in my thesis, it brought with it its own way of 
doing business that touched labor across the globe.  While Michelin is also widely recognized for 
its maps and travel guides, my thesis takes a closer look at the tire manufacturing side of their 
business.   
                                                
1 Paule Muxel and Bertrand Solliers, The World According to Michelin, Arte France documentary film, 2001, 
http://go.bates.edu/director/wend/?url=http://fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID=98931&xtid=53607. 
2 From the beginning, Michelin has been based in Clermont-Ferrand, France, the capital of the Puy-de-Dôme 
department. The company has played an integral role in the growth and culture of the town.       
3 Brothers André and Édouard Michelin took over the family manufacturing business in 1889. They began 
manufacturing tires in 1891. See Herbert R. Lottman, Michelin Men: Driving an Empire (New York: Tauris, 2004), 
17, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/laddbates/detail.action?docID=10133064. 
4 André Gueslin, “Introduction,” in Les Hommes du pneu: Les Ouvriers Michelin à Clermont-Ferrand de 1940 à 
1980, ed. André Gueslin (Paris: Les Éditions de l’Atelier, 1999), 9. 
 6 
Although Michelin’s origins are in the mid-nineteenth century, it was the company’s 
actions at the turn of twentieth century that begin to help us understand the shock and horror 
Édouard Michelin felt when he saw the red flag float over his factories and the company’s 
relationship with organized labor from that point forward, which is my interest in this thesis.  
Around 1905 Michelin began its own brand of paternalism through which they sought to 
maintain a sense of control over their workers.  Writing on industrial paternalism in France, 
historian Donald Reid defined paternalism as “not just the set of institutions that employers offer 
to workers to supplement wages,” but also the “techniques used to create and manipulate the 
affective hierarchical relations” in a manufacturing setting.5  It is in line with this definition of 
paternalism that I will reference paternalism at Michelin in the remainder of this thesis.  
Throughout the beginning of the twentieth century Michelin put several social structures into 
place that aimed to cultivate and maintain a sense of protection between labor and management.  
In his introduction to Les Hommes du pneu: Les Ouvriers Michelin à Clermont-Ferrand de 1940 
à 1980, André Gueslin described how Michelin worked to establish a strong rapport with its 
workers.  Gueslin argued that Michelin-organized schools and summer camps contributed to the 
“formation of a workforce” for workers’ children while health clinics, worker housing, and 
various associations worked to “maintain that workforce.”6  Through the programs and benefits 
Gueslin described, Michelin attempted to mold an ideal and loyal worker, a worker that would 
not join unions or strike.  It was because of this work that Michelin was genuinely shocked and 
horrified by the mobilization it witnessed in 1936.   
As a company, Michelin provided many benefits to their labor force before the law asked 
them to do so.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Michelin increasingly provided 
                                                
5 Donald Reid, “Industrial Paternalism: Discourse and Practice in Nineteenth-Century French Mining and 
Metallurgy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 27, no. 4 (1985), 580. 
6 “la formation d’une main-d’œuvre” and “entretiennent cette main-d’œuvre” from Gueslin, “Introduction,” 9.  
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housing and healthcare for its workers.  In 1905 they introduced a health service for workers and 
their families.7  While what they provided was nowhere near healthcare in its modern 
incarnations, it was something for workers, who elsewhere in France had much less.  In a 
comparative history of healthcare systems in the United States and France, historian Paul Dutton 
explained that in both countries, the early twentieth century marked a resurgence of private-
practice medicine.8  Given the context Dutton provided, France was far from the employer-
provided healthcare already at Michelin.  Michelin’s social protections did not end with 
healthcare.  Writing on the evolution of Michelin-built housing in Clermont-Ferrand, Herbert 
Lottman noted that laws dating from the early twentieth century encouraged the building of 
inexpensive housing for workers without sufficient housing.  He noted that one commentator 
remarked that the residences were designed “for the housewife, for she lives in it far more than 
the worker does.”9  The protections Michelin provided were developed to promote the wellbeing 
and stability of the family unit, not just for the workers themselves.  Over the course of the 
twentieth century, Michelin either constructed or sponsored almost 8000 family housing units on 
land surrounding its Clermont-Ferrand factories.  Although far from luxurious, the housing 
Michelin provided encouraged basic hygiene and healthy living habits, providing an adequate 
amount of space and separate rooms for separate functions.10  Therefore, as Michelin established 
these sorts of programs for its workers, it sought to avoid the labor organization and strikes that 
came to plague the firm’s management.  The Michelin family brought its own idea of what a 
relationship should be between corporate management and labor at its factories when the 
business expanded abroad.  Thus, history of Michelin is important to the international 
                                                
7 Lottman, Michelin Men, 82. 
8 Paul V. Dutton, Differential Diagnoses: A Comparative History of Health Care Problems and Solutions in the 
United States and France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 31.  
9 Lottman, Michelin Men, 83. 
10 Lottman, Michelin Men, 85. 
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understanding of France in the twentieth century and to the history of twentieth-century labor 
politics writ large.  
Just as Michelin was working to establish a sense of loyalty with its workforce, the 
situation of labor in France was changing in unprecedented ways.  The interwar period was one 
of great transformation for the French working classes.  While labor was becoming more and 
more politicized, their bosses, the patronat, searched to appease and control their labor force in 
the midst of global economic crisis.  In France, the victory of the Popular Front in May 1936 was 
a major turning point for labor.  When Léon Blum, the socialist prime minister, took office on 
June 4, 1936 France was in the midst of a massive general strike.  The strike was so paralyzing 
that on June 7th Blum invited representatives of the patronat and the Comité général du travail 
(CGT), a confederation of trade unions, to his official residence, Hôtel Matignon, to come up 
with a solution.  The resolution of this meeting was the Matignon Agreements, another win for 
labor.  The signed accords aimed to put and end to the general strike and were a major blow to 
management.  For labor, two immediate gains were collective labor contracts and an increase in 
wages.11  Reluctantly, representatives of the patronat signed these agreements, although their 
primary motivation was fear.     
The establishment of the Popular Front government and the mobilization of labor 
signified an important turning point in French labor movements of the twentieth century.  As this 
rapid politicization of labor was most visible in the suburbs surrounding Paris, the ring of 
suburbs surrounding Paris came to be known as the Paris Red Belt.  Tyler Stovall, author of The 
Rise of the Paris Red Belt, called to attention the fact that the rise of the Popular Front marked a 
turning point in French labor movements as it marked the large-scale inclusion of unskilled 
                                                
11 Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy (New York: Cambridge, 1988), 9.   
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workers.12  Including groups such as factory workers, this group of unskilled labor represented a 
large force in national politics as they mobilized primarily in the form of strikes and factory 
occupations.  The mobilization of labor reached its peak in June 1936.  The strikes of June 1936 
were larger than any previous annual strike total.  Official records for June 1936 reported 12,142 
strikes and 1,830,938 strikers.13  As the massive strikes and occupations disturbed daily life and 
disrupted production, employers were put in a precarious position, as they feared for their 
survival and success.  
It is within the context of May and June 1936 that I begin my thesis and discussion of 
Michelin’s relationship with labor in its local, national, and international contexts.  Chapter 1 
examines how the Popular Front era represented a break from the past at Michelin, a break which 
has continued to shape its trajectory into the future.  Leading up to World War II, I contend that 
both labor’s view of management and management’s view of labor demonstrated political fears 
of the time.  As Europe prepared for war, workers eventually sided with management.  Chapter 2 
examines how the war interrupted the trajectory of labor at the firm.  By signing collaboration 
agreements with the Germans, Michelin guaranteed the mutual survival of both management and 
labor.  In this way, the wartime years suggest a return to past behavior both in terms of 
Michelin’s agreements with the Reich and in its undercover resistant behavior.  Michelin in the 
postwar period brings up more questions of continuity at the firm, inflected of course by the 
implications of the war.  Chapter 3 argues that war did not end the struggle at Michelin.  Both in 
terms of the firm’s personal losses and relationship with labor, a peace that was desired by many 
did not come to be.  Political fears reemerged alongside fears over labor, however with different 
political meaning in the early years of the Cold War.  Chapter 4 assesses more fully the long 
                                                
12 Tyler Stovall, The Rise of the Paris Red Belt (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 174. 
13 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, 85. 
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term continuities of Michelin as the company integrated into the larger global economy.  Taking 
into consideration how Michelin both uses and ignores its own histories is a way to consider both 
the company’s past and how it figures into their continued behavior and expansion overseas.   
Together, these chapters seek to address the overarching relationship between labor and 
management at Michelin, from efforts to implement a paternalistic program before my story even 
begins to labor strikes that came to be a lens into Michelin for the outside world.  The synthesis 
of labor and management histories at Michelin is important to an understanding of France in the 
twentieth century due to interest in Michelin both inside and outside of France.  Above all, these 
interests in Michelin are important to the larger story of centralization in terms of the global 
economy throughout the twentieth century.  As Michelin became more and more a part of the 
global economy over the course of the twentieth century, an understanding of the relationship 
between labor and management at the company allows for a better look at the political and 
economic contexts of France.   
My original inspiration for this project came from a class I took at Sciences Po in Paris 
last winter taught by Professor Jean Garrigues.  The class examined the relationship between 
political power and money from the end of the Second Empire to more or less the present day.  
In the class’s treatment of World War II we examined the question of economic collaboration.  
For a class assignment I read Annie Lacroix-Riz’s Industriels et banquiers sous l’Occupation: la 
collaboration économique avec le Reich et Vichy.14  In her book and in class discussion I was 
exposed to the complexity of Michelin’s economic collaboration and simultaneous resistance.  I 
was fascinated by the dual nature of Michelin’s activity during the war, and in particular how 
both were remembered in the years that followed.   
                                                
14 Annie Lacroix-Riz, Industriels et banquiers sous l’Occupation: la collaboration économique avec le Reich et 
Vichy (Paris: A. Colin, 1999). 
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Much of the reason why this question of Michelin during the war originally fascinated me 
has to do with my own family history.  Although it does not have to do with France per se, it 
does have to do with collaboration and resistance during World War II.  My grandfather was 
born in Belgium in 1925 to a Belgian mother and an American father.  During the war Germans 
occupied his family’s home.  My grandfather joined the Resistance in the later years of the war.  
In the later years of his life, he has demonstrated a willingness to share with me his memories of 
the war.  The mark his recollections of the war have had on me encouraged me to pursue what I 
originally thought would be a thesis related to the war.     
As I was first considering the question of Michelin I was also considering my own family 
history.  What did I think of my great-great grandparents for letting Nazis into their home?  Did 
my grandfather’s time in the Resistance somehow make up for that?  It was this synthesis 
between my own family history and the question of Michelin in a history class at Sciences Po 
that led me to originally base my thesis on these questions.  However, research had other plans 
for my project.  As I engaged with other scholarly work on the war and Michelin in particular, I 
found that my story to tell about Michelin had to do more with how the company defined its 
relationship between management and labor from the tumultuous end of the 1930s into the 
memory of the postwar period.  Even though my work has changed from an original focus on the 
memory of the labels of “collaborator” and “resistant,” these themes and considerations are 
inherently present in many parts of my writing.  
As my project evolved from a project specific only to the war and its memory into a 
longer history of labor and capital in the twentieth century, other scholars have been instrumental 
in constructing a longer timeline of France in the twentieth century.  In distancing my work from 
the treatment of collaboration and resistance, I turned to works on labor and corporate histories 
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to create my own longer history of these two groups at Michelin.15  Inevitably, corporate and 
labor histories have far different aims in their writing.  While I have engaged with histories that 
do at some level incorporate the two, it is largely in my own research that I have created this 
history of labor and capital at Michelin.  
I have drawn from histories of specific time periods in different chapters to set up the 
greater political context of labor and Michelin at the given time.  Chapter 1 considers more 
carefully literature on the Popular Front that was also important to my long-term understanding 
of labor.16  For World War II covered in chapter 2, I rely on works that contextualized 
collaboration and occupation including Peter Davies’s Dangerous Liaisons and Roderick 
Kedward’s and Roger Austin’s work published in Vichy France and the Resistance.17  In chapter 
3, much of my larger focus was on the international press at that time, as well as secondary 
literature focusing on the situation of labor following the war, notably George Ross’s Workers 
and Communists in France.18  For the question of memory in chapter 4, Henry Rousso’s 
instrumental work in The Vichy Syndrome helped me to establish a timeline for considering the 
historical memory of France following the war.19  These histories alongside more general 
histories of labor and Michelin have allowed me to construct my own history of labor at 
Michelin.  As helpful as they are, these histories do tend to be kept distinct from one another 
within existing scholarship. 
                                                
15 For labor, see George Ross, Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1982); Stovall, The Rise of The Paris Red Belt.  
For corporate, see Kathryn E. Amdur, “Paternalism, Productivism, Collaborationism: Employers and Society in 
Interwar and Vichy France,” International Labor and Working Class History 53, (Spring 1998): 137-163, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27672460. 
16 See for example Jackson, The Popular Front in France; Stovall, The Rise of the Paris Red Belt.  
17 Peter Davies, Dangerous Liaisons: Collaboration and World War Two (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2004). 
Roderick Kedward and Roger Austin (eds.), Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology (Totowa, NJ: 
Barnes and Noble, 1985). 
18 Ross, Workers and Communists in France. 
19 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).  
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Corporate histories tend to paint an optimistic vision of Michelin’s corporate behavior.  
Herbert Lottman’s book Michelin Men: Driving an Empire and Paule Muxel’s and Bertrand 
Solliers’s documentary The World According to Michelin present the company in a way that 
discuss the disruptions labor caused but do not delve into the root causes or political contexts.  
Although Lottman’s work looks very favorably at Michelin, they did not authorize his work.20  
Even though Lottman glosses over many less glorious moments in the company’s history, he 
does not omit much.  He includes basic details of the firm’s involvement with the Cagoule fascist 
group and its involvement in a September 1937 bombing in Paris.  Overall, Lottman presents a 
variety of sources in his research that depict an overarching history of Michelin.  Muxel’s and 
Solliers’s documentary presents a similar history to Lottman.  However, they speak very 
specifically to Michelin’s corporate culture, paternalism at the firm in particular.21  To 
accomplish this, their film includes recollections from workers and their descendants.  Although 
Michelin is mentioned in other corporate histories, only these two works focus specifically on 
Michelin.  While these sources specific to Michelin are helpful in understanding the company’s 
history, their treatment of Michelin’s century-long history largely excludes the broader 
discussion of how events at Michelin relate to labor movements and their international 
consequences.     
Other than corporate literature specific to Michelin, there is the discussion of more 
general French corporate history.  In my treatment of Michelin, this history touches specifically 
on paternalism and corporate culture in France.  “Paternalism, Productivism, Collaborationism: 
Employers and Society in Interwar and Vichy France” by Kathryn Amdur details the history of 
                                                
20 Lottman, Michelin Men, ix. 
21 Muxel and Solliers, The World According to Michelin. 
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paternalism in France in the specific period that my work focuses on.22  Beyond Amdur’s 
treatment of paternalism in interwar and Vichy France, the work of Antoin Murphy in his article 
“Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History” provides broader contextualization 
of French corporate history.23  His work includes discussion of Michelin, however his focus is on 
corporate structure rather than labor.  Together, both of these works provide a more general 
history of French corporate history in the twentieth century.  As much as their work is insightful 
and necessary in my research it largely excludes the discussion of labor.  This becomes 
problematic in that their understanding and analysis of conflict only addresses the perspective of 
management.  In addition to these sources that consider French corporate history, there is the 
larger consideration of business history as a whole.  For this, Philip Scranton’s and Patrick 
Fridenson’s Reimagining Business History was a helpful resource in considering the field as a 
whole.24  
The labor histories I examined focused on both specific moments and long-term trends, 
yet they exclude the corporate perspective.  Several works that look specifically at the Popular 
Front era helped to examine long-term trends and the beginning of my story at Michelin.  Tyler 
Stovall’s The Rise of the Paris Red Belt provides a detailed understanding of the origins and 
broader context of the Popular Front.25  In addition, Julian Jackson’s The Popular Front in 
France further contextualizes labor in the late 1930s.26  While both of their works are specific to 
the Popular Front government, their contextualization and understanding of this moment helps to 
understand later labor movements in my own research.  Although they accomplished the 
                                                
22 Amdur, “Paternalism, Productivism, Collaborationism.”   
23 Antoin E. Murphy, “Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper 10716 (2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10716.pdf.  
24 Philip Scranton, and Patrick Fridenson, Reimagining Business History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2013).  
25 Stovall, The Rise of the Paris Red Belt. 
26 Jackson, The Popular Front in France.  
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aforementioned, they paint a one-sided understanding of the relationship between management 
and labor.   
Aside from labor histories that focus specifically on the Popular Front, more specific 
pieces on labor have added to my own understanding of labor at Michelin.  George Ross’s 
Workers and Communists in France provides an understanding of the long-term organization 
history of the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) that was responsible for most labor 
organization at Michelin.27  Specifically in understanding labor at Michelin, the collection of 
essays published in Les Hommes du pneu: Les ouvriers Michelin à Clermont-Ferrand de 1940 à 
1980 explores workers’ relationship to the Michelin Corporation.28   
By combining these histories, bringing together labor, corporate history, and key 
moments in twentieth century French history in my account of labor and management at 
Michelin from the 1930s to the late twentieth century, I hope to tell a story of both labor and 
management at Michelin that addresses the long-term continuities of life at the manufacturer that 
adds to the general understanding of global labor and corporations in the twentieth century.       
  
                                                
27 Ross, Workers and Communists in France.  
28 André Gueslin, ed., Les Hommes du pneu: Les Ouvriers Michelin à Clermont-Ferrand de 1940 à 1980 (Paris: Les 
Éditions de l’Atelier, 1999). 
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Chapter One 
Interwar Conflict at Michelin 
 
 
 
“For some, this was the eve of a long-awaited revolution;  
for others, it was a monumental threat to French society.”29 
 
 
 
At the end of the 1930s the world of the industrial patronat was seemingly turned upside 
down as they watched a leftist government gain control and as societal fears over the future of 
Europe became realities.  At Michelin, management thought it had successfully navigated 
conflicts with labor through the various social protections they provided.  However, Michelin 
was far from insulated from the labor conflict of the late 1930s.  Considering both the communist 
perspective inside of France with L’Humanité, the communist newspaper, and an international 
understanding of events in France through The Times and The New York Times, it was possible to 
analyze the effects of events as they were happening in France on labor, management, and the 
international community.  As much as L’Humanité must be considered as the official daily of the 
communist party, the discussions present provided a clear understanding of what labor wanted 
and how it viewed management.  Particularly in moments like the aftermath of the September 
1937 bombs, L’Humanité clearly demonstrated what fueled labor to act.30  To sources outside of 
France, what was happening at Michelin represented the larger conflict with labor in France and 
the fear of the future of Europe.  While accusations of Michelin as fascist in the communist press 
did speak to labor’s understanding of management, it was an accusation that would soon be 
irrelevant given Michelin’s activity during the war.  Even though labor eventually fell from 
                                                
29 Pierre Martin, “Industrial Structure, Coalition Politics, and Economic Policy: The Rise and Decline of the French 
Popular Front,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 1 (1991), 45, http://www.jstor.org/stable/422201. 
30 On September 11, 1937 a Michelin employee was involved in the planning of a Paris bombing attack orchestrated 
by the Cagoule, a fascist-leaning, anti-communist group.  
 17 
power, a decrease in the number of disputes did not mean that conflict with labor was no longer a 
question at the firm.  As Michelin and the rest of Europe prepared for war, the firm as a whole, 
labor and management, defined itself by working together to help France prepare for the coming 
reality of war on French soil.  Working with this interest in mind, workers sided with Michelin, a 
move that guaranteed many of them employment and protection in the years to come.  
Other authors on this time period at Michelin have primarily focused on how the 1930s 
represented a break from the past for Michelin.  The writings of Gueslin and Lottman on the late 
1930s at Michelin have largely focused on labor at the firm in its relationship to the larger labor 
movement in France.  In considering this perspective alongside how labor at Michelin was seen 
from outside of France, this chapter works to construct the beginning of a longer narrative of 
labor at Michelin.  Above all, this chapter examines the relationship between labor and 
management at Michelin in the tense moment of the late 1930s not only to consider in what ways 
the Popular Front era demonstrated a break from that past at Michelin, but more so to consider 
long-term trends in labor and corporate practices at the firm.       
 
A Break from the Past  
Prior to 1936, unions gained little traction in Michelin’s factories.  Writing of the labor 
climate at Michelin before 1936, Herbert Lottman noted that the potential power of labor was 
checked by “the astute carrot-and-stick tactics of the company.”31  Although isolated conflicts 
occurred before 1936, this year marked a turning point for labor at the company.  By June 1936, 
the situation of labor at Michelin had changed for good as Michelin factory workers took place in 
massive strikes alongside the rest of the country.  Leading up to June 1936, the climate of labor 
in France and at Michelin was changing.  France was recovering from the economic depression 
                                                
31 Lottman, Michelin Men, 171. 
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that defined the first half of the decade and production at Michelin was on the rise.  However, 
just as the production of rubber was on the rise, so was the organization of labor.  An article from 
a March 1936 edition of L’Humanité titled “The Economic Situation and Worker’s Struggles” 
contextualized the situation of labor amidst industrial production.  Listing current production in 
several manufacturing sectors compared to the previous year, the production of rubber was up 
compared to the monthly average for 1935.  The communist direction of L’Humanité recognized 
increased economic success as a way to leverage the importance of labor against the power of the 
manufacturing patronat.  The author used the article to pose a rhetorical question, asking what 
was significant between the rising production of rubber and the organization of factory workers 
at firms such as Michelin, suggesting that labor reforms were beneficial to production.32  Using 
this article to understand the position of labor before June 1936, it was clear that labor was 
increasingly conscious of the force they represented and saw rising production as justification for 
voicing their demands. 
 Leading up to the June 7, 1936 Matignon Agreements, workers were mobilizing more 
and more to assert their desire for better working conditions.  One question of debate later 
addressed in the Matignon Agreements was collective contracts.  The May 22, 1936 edition of 
L’Humanité addressed metalworkers, a category that included Michelin, urging for a collective 
contract.  The author described the situation at hand by noting how the largest employers 
continued to increase their own benefits and privileges at the expense of their workers.  The 
author called out several manufacturers, including Michelin, saying that “misery” and 
“discomfort” were affecting workers while the patronat was seeing their profits increase by the 
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millions.33  Clearly L’Humanité presented an opinion very much sympathetic to the working 
cause, however the question of collective contracts that was addressed in this article was a 
pressing concern.  Seeking to guarantee a minimum salary and acceptable working conditions, 
collective contracts were one of the major concerns addressed in the Matignon Agreements.34    
In May and June 1936 the largest strikes in the history of France disrupted daily life in 
unprecedented ways.  Official records recorded 12,142 strikes in June 1936, nearly 9000 of the 
which consisted of factory occupations.35  Given the sheer number of workers it employed and 
its position as a large manufacturer, Michelin was far from insulated from the mobilization of 
labor under the Popular Front.  Michelin first felt the severity of the situation in Paris where 
Pierre Michelin, son of Édouard, was serving as director of Citroën.  In Paris, workers went on 
strike Sunday, June 7th, the same day as the meeting at Hôtel Matignon.  By Monday, much of 
the Michelin labor force was on strike.  After twelve days of inactivity, management proposed an 
offer—a modest increase in wages and other protections for strikers.36  As much as this 
agreement appeased workers for the time being, it was a blow to Michelin management as they 
were forced to compromise, just as representatives of the patronat were forced to compromise 
when they signed the Matignon Agreements.  While Michelin was only one company affected by 
the strikes and political climate of May and June 1936, a glimpse into the forced compromise at 
Michelin is indicative of the situation throughout France.  This strike at Michelin alongside 
growing conflict elsewhere symbolized the growing power of labor in factories, as they 
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possessed the power to bring production to a halt, allowing them to demand increased wages and 
protections.  
Despite initial agreements between management and labor, the situation in the factories 
was far from stable.  Union membership drastically increased after the Popular Front victory in 
June.  By December 1936, almost all of Michelin’s labor force was part of a union, with three-
fourths of the union members belonging to the CGT.37  Workers’ adherence to unions and the 
rise of the Communist party among labor was particularly evident in Clermont-Ferrand, the 
center of Michelin’s operations.  By 1937, the CGT’s influence at Michelin had increased even 
more.  In April 1937 L’Humanité reported on a CGT victory at Michelin.  This victory consisted 
of Michelin workers reaffirming their allegiance to the CGT.  The article reported that the 112 
delegates presented by the CGT union got nearly 6000 votes compared to only 72 votes for a 
conservative union.  Writing in the official organ of the CGT, the author optimistically reported 
that the result exceeded every expectation, elaborating on how management was handedly beaten 
by this latest victory.38  As workers organized under the CGT banner, demonstrations continued 
to be a part of factory life as long as their concerns were left unmet.  Workers at Michelin and 
elsewhere commanded that management and other authorities listen to their demands.  The 
January 17, 1938 L’Humanité reported on a demonstration of 6000 Michelin workers in 
Clermont-Ferrand.  In addition to reporting on the size of the protest, the article noted that the 
protesters also sent the President a telegram asking for more organization representation in the 
government.39  More than a year and a half after the first large-scale demonstrations at Michelin, 
the climate of labor was still such that the CGT could execute a demonstration with 6000 
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workers.  The years following June 1936 clearly demonstrated that workers used the force they 
knew they represented in the factory to make demands of their employers and to further their 
cause for the betterment of their own wages and working conditions.  Labor’s unprecedented 
mobilization at Michelin and elsewhere demonstrated not only the situation of labor but the 
larger political context of France and Europe at the time.  
 
Fears Beyond Michelin  
The political fears of labor and management expressed themselves in their actions 
towards the other group, particularly through the lens of fascism.  As fascism was a real and 
perceived threat in this moment, the communist press was eager to label Michelin and other 
similar companies as fascist.  Given the context of the Spanish Civil War and Hitler’s rise to 
power, the label of fascist carried meaning when ascribed to a specific group.  This political 
context played into how the Communist party and labor viewed large industrial employers such 
as Michelin.  A September 1936 L’Humanité article called members of the Michelin family and 
the organization as a whole fascist due to a counter-protest that took place in response to a strike.  
In response to a workers’ strike at Michelin, pro-Michelin demonstrators occupied the regional 
Puy-de-Dôme prefecture.  The author of the article accused the demonstration of being a symbol 
of the fascists’ power and how far management was willing to go to suppress workers’ 
movements.40  In this instance, it was clear that labor not only viewed the direction of Michelin 
as fascist, but also vehemently opposed any demonstrations that sought to counter their own, an 
opinion clearly expressed in the L’Humanité article.  Above all, management was fighting for a 
future in which they would be insulated from the disruptive influences of labor, far different 
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from the future labor was fighting for.  In the confrontations between management and labor 
L’Humanité reported on the paper clearly illustrated how communist labor forces opposed the 
vision of management.  Another L’Humanité article from January 1938 went as far as calling 
organizations including Michelin enemies of liberty.41  While communist forces labeling 
Michelin as fascist spoke to legitimate fears of the time, the label of fascist was also used as a 
tactic in mobilizing labor to act against management.  Even though each side had greatly 
differing opinions on how to better the workplace, fear played an important role in each of their 
accusations and actions.  As the patronat was fearful of a communist future, labor was equally 
fearful of a fascist future.  
Beyond France, the threat of fascism had a different tone that took into consideration the 
stability of Europe as a whole rather than the actions of one group.  As Europe was marked by 
the serious political consequences of the Spanish Civil War and a changing situation in 
Germany, outside views of the situation in France spoke to the same fear of fascism addressed in 
the more global context of European stability.  An article in The Times of London, for example, 
brought up fascism in its conversation of strikes in Clermont-Ferrand, yet the point it made was 
far different from that of L’Humanité.  Rather than calling the industrial management fascist, the 
Times article warned that if such strikes continued, the public would lose sympathy for the 
working class, and that such a reaction “might lead to anarchy and finally to Fascism.”42  This 
point made in The Times conveyed not only international interest in the current situation in 
France, particularly at Michelin, but also concerns over the political and economic stability of 
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Europe.  In this larger context, discussion of conflict at Michelin in Clermont-Ferrand expressed 
international interest in the future of France and Europe in the face of the threat of fascism.  
The New York Times reported on the counter protest at Michelin in an article titled 
“French Rightists Fight Red Strikes.”  Because of this source’s distance from the events, it 
illustrated a much different understanding of the strikes in Clermont-Ferrand.  It stated that 3000 
loyal workers seized the Puy-de-Dôme prefecture after 7000 workers seized the factory.  Its 
author contextualized the conflict at Michelin amidst other strikes taking place in France and the 
broader actions of the CGT.43  Although the United States was removed from the realities of the 
labor situation in France, the scope of the article demonstrated how the destabilizing power of 
labor was having detrimental effects on international political and economic stability.  Aside 
from demonstrating interest in the French labor movement outside of France, the article also 
revealed a certain level of solidarity many workers felt towards their employer, a fervor Michelin 
had worked hard to instill.  As an organization, Michelin had implemented many programs that 
attempted to shape their ideal worker and breed a sense of loyalty to the company.  They 
provided long-term benefits for employees and had many sporting and social clubs.44 Although 
there were 7000 workers protesting against them, there was also a loyal 3000 that felt so strongly 
about their relationship with Michelin that they were compelled to act, occupying the local 
prefecture.  Speaking to the mob-like character of the prefecture occupation, the author wrote 
that “Only the intervention of Pierre Michelin prevented the ugly situation from becoming 
tragic.”45  Recognizing that a member of Michelin’s corporate management was able to calm the 
situation indicated that the “rightist” workers were protesting not only to express their own 
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political beliefs but to also due to their respect for Michelin.  When Pierre Michelin saw the 
situation as out of hand and asked them to stop, they obeyed.  Far different from the account 
L’Humanité gave of the counter protest, this report illustrated exactly the kind of loyalty that 
Michelin worked to instill with its employees.  
In addition to the New York Times’ account of the September 8, 1936 protests, the 
London Times also detailed worker loyalty to Michelin in their description of the demonstration.  
In their description of the September 8, 1936 protests, The Times of London reported that 2000 
workers took part in an “unusual” counter-demonstration in which they occupied the local 
prefecture from the morning until 7:30pm.  Similar to the New York Times account of the 
demonstration, the author recognized that Pierre Michelin himself played a role in breaking up 
the protest.  The author wrote that at 7:30pm, “leaders of the occupying workmen announced 
from the balcony that they had decided, at the request of M. Michelin himself, to vacate the 
building on condition that they were protected from violence.”46  Both the New York Times and 
the Times accounts of the counter-protest revealed a different side of the French labor conflict to 
an international audience.  While accounts inside of France focused on the rising power of labor, 
these international descriptions of events at Michelin conveyed a different perspective, one of 
loyal workers fighting against the destabilizing power of organized labor.  Although these 
accounts had a different aim in calming international fears, they indicated the importance of 
Michelin in examining the current situation in France.  Beyond their interest in international 
stability, these reports in The New York Times and The Times served to contextualize their own 
labor situations.  As the global economy emerged from the Great Depression, both the United 
Kingdom and the United States struggled with combatting high rates of unemployment.  In the 
United States in particular, the prevalence of unions rose sharply in the second half of the 
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1930s.47  In this given context, the mobilization of labor was not limited to France, even though 
the French situation was much more exaggerated given the current government.  Therefore, 
international interest in French labor was tied to what was happening in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom at the same time.         
As much as the late 1930s were a trying time for the company’s relationship with its 
workers, it did not completely dissolve the relationship between the two.  As one author noted in 
a comparison between communist labor of the 1930s and resistance activity of the 1940s, many 
workers that were active in 1936 were ones that resisted during the war.48  As Michelin 
safeguarded some aspects of its relationship with labor, their trajectory was different from other 
firms.  Amidst discussions of massive strikes, the June 3, 1936 L’Humanité also included a 
section of “victories.”  One such victory was the guarantee of eight days of paid leave at 
Michelin’s factories in Clermont-Ferrand announced by Pierre Michelin May 28th.  Although this 
concession was heralded as a victory in the communist press, it was also claimed that Michelin 
only made this concession after hearing of the massive strikes taking place in the Parisian 
suburbs.49  Although the newspaper discredited the actions taken by Michelin’s management in 
claiming that they were motivated by the actions of the PCF in the Paris suburbs, it was an 
undeniable victory for labor in their quest for working rights.   
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Management Unfit to Lead 
While a portion of its labor remained loyal to the company, Michelin’s association with 
one event on September 10, 1937 seriously compromised their position as an organization and 
only furthered the cause against them.  On the night of September 7, 1937 two bombs exploded 
in Paris near the Champs-Elysées, targeting the headquarters of the French employers’ 
association and the headquarters of the federation of metal industries nearby, two organizations 
that represented industrial authority.  Although first believed to be the work of the radical left, 
these bombings were the work of the Cagoule, a clandestine group of right-wing extremists.  
Cagoule leadership believed that by attacking large business interests the radical left would be 
blamed and the right-wing and military would in turn take control.  The logic of their argument 
aside, the mastermind of the attacks was René Locuty, an engineer at Michelin in Clermont-
Ferrand.50  In January 1938, several Cagoule members linked to the bombings were arrested and 
the public gained an increased understanding of how the terrorists responsible were bred by the 
extreme right.  Throughout January 1938, the latest details of the arrests were all over the press.  
On January 11, The Times of London confirmed that the “agents provacateurs” of the September 
bombings were indeed agents of the extreme right, going so far as to call the bomb plot an 
“alleged trick by the extreme right.”51  A day later on January 12, The New York Times provided 
an update on the arrests related to the September bombings.  After reporting on individuals 
arrested for their connections to the attacks, the author turned to the workers at Michelin in 
Clermont-Ferrand, where Locuty had been employed for two years.  The author wrote that the 
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workers held “a symbolic quarter-hour strike ‘to protest against terrorists in our midst.’”52 As 
updates on the arrests and news of the workers’ actions reached beyond France, the involvement 
of a right-wing Michelin employee reflected poorly upon the reputation of the firm and only 
strengthened labor’s action against them, particularly in its connection to a fascist ideology.   
At Michelin and beyond, Michelin’s involvement in the Cagoule incident served as an 
example of how the patronat was unfit to lead the country.  L’Humanité accused those associated 
with the attacks of participating in a “plot against France.”53  The communist press was full of 
remarks, both serious and satirical, against the right wing and its position of power.  The front 
page of the January 23, 1938 L’Humanité included a political cartoon of a Cagoule member 
paying visits to the ministers of public heath, foreign affairs, finances, commerce, public works, 
and justice with a caption that read: “The Cagoule has specialists at their disposal, ready to 
accept the responsibilities of their authority.”54  This cartoon addressed the violent nature of the 
Cagoule’s attacks, as well as the conservatives’ close relationship to political power and 
authority.     
 
55 
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As revelations about the details of the September 1937 attacks continued, the 
Communist’s cause was strengthened and they used the Cagoule incident as leverage as they 
continued to make demands of management.  Workers continued to organize to express what 
they wanted from management.  On February 26, 1938 delegates from Citroën-Michelin met at 
an inter-factory conference in Paris to discuss their program to better the rights for the firm’s 
22,000 workers.  The March 1 L’Humanité summarized the major resolutions that came out of 
their meeting, most of which were based on suggestions put forth by the CGT.  First of all, the 
delegates asked to grant workers a status that would protect their rights.  Secondly, the delegates 
called for further discussion of collective rights proposed by their union.56  This meeting and the 
demands it put forth demonstrated the continued strength of the labor movement in Michelin’s 
factories and that management was still obligated to consider their demands as they continued to 
organize in such a systematic fashion.  Nearly two years after their original mobilization, their 
continued cry for demands recognized that labor was still not satisfied.   
In addition to the demands that labor continued to make, they were also motivated to act 
on promises that were made by management but never put into practice.  L’Humanité reported 
that management had promised 40-hour workweeks for the month of January 1938.  The article 
was written to criticize management for changing its promise of a 40-hour workweek into a 48-
hour work week for the week of January 9-14.  Written by the CGT union secretary at Michelin-
Citroën, the author clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the management of the firm.  He 
wrote that the management of Citroën and Michelin “want revenge for June 1936.”57  His 
attitude clearly expressed a continued divide between management and labor, arguing that 
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management’s action contrary to the demands of labor was to seek revenge for their massive 
mobilization.  In addition to the authors’ comments on Michelin’s unfulfilled promise, he 
mocked the company’s philanthropic mission.  He accused them of using their supposed 
philanthropy to cover up their less favorable actions, citing an incident where sick workers 
contracts were not renewed.58  The philanthropy the article addressed was a clear stab at 
Michelin’s brand of paternalism.  While labor viewed this practice as a way of covering up less 
actions, management had seen it as a way of appeasing workers to avoid labor disputes.  More 
than two years after the meetings of June 1936 at Hôtel Matignon, this article illustrated how 
labor continued to demand the promises made to them. 
 
Preparing for War  
Even though the decline of the Popular Front helped Michelin regain a sense of control in 
its factories, it did not mark the end of organized labor conflict at the firm.  By 1937, the left in 
power was becoming increasingly divided leading to Leon Blum’s resignation in June 1937.  
This turning point was also marked by a poor economy with decreased production figures.  
Rather, the temporary subsiding of labor activity represented the larger political context, one in 
which the continent was preparing for war.  
While 1937 and 1938 clearly marked a change in the tone of organized labor leading up 
to the war, its effect on life at Michelin was not as clear.  One author, Pascale Quincy-Lefebvre, 
argued that after December 1938, Michelin was once again the “master” of its factories, asserting 
that management had won in the battle against labor.59  While 1938 certainly did not mark an end 
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to the organized labor conflict at Michelin, it did mark a turning point after which workers were 
less mobilized for the communist cause in the years leading up to the war.  Another author, 
André Gueslin, wrote in a history of labor at Michelin that even though workers violently 
protested the control of their patronat in 1936, in 1938 they rejected the new direction of the 
communist party.60  As much as the assessments of both Lefebvre and Gueslin spoke to the 
diminishing power of labor at Michelin, they must be considered in the larger political context.  
Although the climate of labor at Michelin was changing as Europe prepared for war, 1938 did 
not mark the end of organized labor at Michelin.  Rather labor subsiding momentarily in 1938 
was part of the long-term ebbs and flows of labor in its conflict at Michelin.  As Europe grew 
closer and closer to war, the political climate was changing in such a way that labor’s demands 
were not at the forefront of national politics.   
At the outbreak of war of war in Europe, Michelin rallied for the cause of national 
defense, expanding their workforce and their production.  Between 1937 and 1940, Michelin 
increased its workforce from 8,500 to 10,000 workers.61  Following the German invasion of 
Poland September 1, 1939, Michelin drastically upped its production of heavyweight tires and 
gas masks.  Months earlier, in March 1939, L’Humanité reported a rumor that Michelin had been 
asked to make gas masks by the Secretary of Defense.  The article revealed that Michelin refused 
this request, as the author criticized the Secretary of Defense for not forcing Michelin to 
complete this request for the sake of national defense.62  Even if Michelin refused this initial 
request to fabricate gas masks, the reality of the situation was drastically different by September.  
Questions over labor and its role at Michelin were no longer at the center of debates.  As Europe 
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grew closer to total war, labor was quieted by the demands of national production.  Growing and 
continued employment at Michelin would come to play a very important role in the coming 
years. 
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Chapter Two 
Life and Labor during the War 
 
 
 
When the French government fell apart, Michelin formally sided with the Vichy regime, 
signing agreements to deliver its valuable rubber products to the Reich.  While division and 
conflict had defined the 1930s at Michelin, the wartime years were characterized by a sense of 
unity between between management and labor.  During the war Michelin found a balance 
between collaboration and resistance that not only required the cooperation of its workforce, but 
also guaranteed the mutual survival of both labor and management.  This sense of unity was 
created not only by Michelin itself, but also through the requirements of the Vichy regime.  
When the Vichy-censored press spoke of Michelin and Clermont-Ferrand, it painted a picture of 
cohesion that demonstrated the cultural ideals the regime was working to foster.   While other 
sources alluded to what was happening in France in ways that contradicted the Vichy regime, 
what can be gathered of the war from inside of France was largely seen through the specific lens 
of Vichy.  Vichy’s portrayal of Michelin and Clermont-Ferrand during the war was clearly 
demonstrated in the daily newspaper Le Petit Journal.  As a source published continuously in 
Clermont-Ferrand throughout the war, Le Petit Journal shed light upon the sorts of events 
happening around Clermont-Ferrand as they were seen in the eyes of the rest of occupied France.  
Overall, the French press’s treatment of the relationship between industrial firms and their labor 
sought to encourage a sense of unity between the two in line with national ideals, while 
reminding both management and labor of their respective responsibilities and obligations.  While 
Michelin did not fit the mold of Vichy’s ideal collaborator, they were inevitably at the center of 
the conversations and themes present in the Vichy-censored press.  Beyond France, the press 
painted a much different picture of what was happening at Michelin and in Clermont-Ferrand.  In 
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the overlaps between what was being portrayed in the censored French press, what was reported 
abroad, and the undercover actions only widely discovered after the war, the uniqueness of 
Michelin comes to light.  At Michelin, the wartime years brought to the forefront the enduring 
history of management’s paternalism and its relationship to workers.  During this time, the 
relationship between labor and management was defined not by conflict but rather by cohesion 
that allowed them to survive the war, although this coming together was simultaneously 
contributing to making France the largest contributor of armaments and products to the Reich.63  
Outside of France, Michelin was seen in a much more human light, even given its 
arrangements with the Germans.  The international community spoke to instances in which 
Michelin spoke against the turning tide of European politics and the protections Michelin was 
able to provide by accepting the consequences of collaboration.  Particularly, in considering the 
tradeoff of collaboration for being able to prevent the departure of many of its workers to forced 
labor in Germany, it was clear that a unique attitude towards labor persisted at Michelin.  While 
the late 1930s were characterized by contempt and conflict with labor, Michelin’s behavior 
during the war brought to light the paternalistic corporate behavior Michelin had adopted long 
before the war required it.  Michelin’s actions during the war spoke to a longer company history 
with labor, one that was able to withstand the tests of general strikes and the tragedies of war to 
continue to establish a history once German troops left Clermont-Ferrand.  
In the scope of my research, the only time Le Petit Journal singled out the Michelin 
family is upon the death of Édouard Michelin on August 25, 1940.  A founder of the tire 
company with his brother André, the brothers were responsible for transforming the family 
factory into an industry leader.  As seen from both inside and outside of France, Édouard was 
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respected as an innovative and important leader in French industrial society.  Passing away at the 
age of 84, Le Petit Journal remembered Édouard as the “creator of the large French tire firm.”64  
Although his passing was mentioned in Le Petit Journal, it was not embellished.  On the other 
side of the Atlantic, his passing was commemorated with much different memories of his life.  In 
The New York Times the day after his death, Édouard was credited for foreseeing bombing raids 
and for warning of the danger of German aviation following the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.  
The author wrote that Édouard and André “called attention to the ease and rapidity with which a 
peace-time airplane could be transformed into a bomber” referring to how the treaty forbade 
military aviation but allowed for commercial activity.65  Being lauded for both his industrial and 
political contributions to modern society, the American press was much more favorable to 
discussing how the Michelins differ from other French industrialists.  Inside of France, the 
Michelins were industrialists producing for the Reich.  Beyond France, their memory was much 
more positive, crediting them for having warned against the risk of German aviation and for their 
contributions to the contemporary world.   
 
Clermont-Ferrand in Vichy’s Social Regime 
Beyond this sole consideration of a Michelin family member during the war, appearances 
of Clermont-Ferrand in the Vichy press served to paint the picture of a unified regime.  
Throughout the war, Le Petit Journal portrayed life in Clermont-Ferrand as similar to life in any 
other occupied town, emphasizing when the town clearly portrayed the regime’s cultural ideals.  
Le Petit Journal focused on highlighting social values important to the Vichy government 
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including traditional family values, gendered roles in society, faith, and honor to military service.  
The paper treated Clermont-Ferrand as similar to other occupied towns in that it glossed over any 
activity that could be seen as subversive to Vichy.  In accordance with the paper’s agenda as a 
piece of Vichy propaganda, it increasingly voiced in what ways Clermont-Ferrand was 
upholding traditional values as the war progressed and resistance activity increased.   In this 
piece of wartime propaganda, Clermont-Ferrand was seen as reiterating Vichy’s cultural agenda 
to encourage a sense of social unity in occupied France.    
One particular way Vichy emphasized a sense of cultural unity in Clermont-Ferrand was 
through religion.  Because Vichy focused in particular on building a Christian regime, religion 
was an acceptable and encouraged theme to discuss in the press.66  Throughout the war, the 
editors of the paper upheld religion as an important way to come to terms with the changes in 
everyday life and to reinforce a traditional societal order.  On Bastille Day, July 14, 1940, the 
front page of the paper reported on an event at the Notre Dame du Retour (Our Lady of Return) 
cathedral in Clermont-Ferrand.  The paper described a ceremony held at the cathedral in which 
family members brought portraits of their sons, husbands, friends that had left for war to be 
consecrated to the patron saint of travelers.67  This event addressed the reality of numerous 
young men heading off to war, and how their families and town were coping with their 
departure.  Instead of reporting on the emotion or distress wives and mothers dealt with as men 
left for war, this article emphasized a constructive and traditionally acceptable approach to facing 
such turmoil, to turn to God, and in this case the patron saint of travelers to pray for a safe return.  
Another specific focus on religion in Le Petit Journal was the recognition of a national day of 
prayer in honor of all those who died during The Great War and the present conflict.  Reporting 
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on this day of remembrance, the November 15, 1943 edition of Le Petit Journal specifically 
acknowledged commemorations in Clermont-Ferrand the day prior.  The article mentioned a 
mass presided over by the bishop of Clermont and emphasized the bishop’s message of the 
importance of recognizing the sacrifice these men made for their country, encouraging all 
Frenchmen to unite for this cause.68  Although similar events more than likely took place in most 
occupied towns, it was small glimpses into life in occupied Clermont-Ferrand that conformed 
with behavior deemed appropriate by Vichy that allowed the Vichy press to portray a solid, 
unified image of France under their control.   
It was social and cultural ceremonies, such as the consecration of soldiers’ portraits and 
days of prayer that characterized how the Vichy regime was perceived in Clermont-Ferrand 
rather than economic incentives.  Writing in the introduction to a collection of essays titled Vichy 
France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology Roderick Kedward described that the Vichy 
regime was “full of political and cultural ideas which had little or no economic consistency.”  
Additionally, Kedward highlighted the emphasis Vichy placed on “provincial traditions.”69  It 
was clear then why a town like Clermont-Ferrand came to take on such an important role in the 
construction of the Vichy regime.  In detailing culturally conservative events in a town far 
removed from Paris, Le Petit Journal emphasized two important tenets of the Vichy regime 
described by Kedward.  First of all, the return to religion detailed the sort of conservative cultural 
regime Vichy aspired to create.  In addition, the inclusion of Clermont-Ferrand represented a 
more provincial perspective beyond a large city center.   Reporting on instances where the town 
of Clermont-Ferrand came together to honor soldiers departing for war and those who never 
returned communicated an image of persistent collaboration and social stability that were 
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essential to the Vichy regime gaining and maintaining control.  These ways of portraying life in 
Clermont-Ferrand addressed not only the needs of the Reich, but also sought to paint a picture of 
unity that was not necessarily the case.  While the paper was published in Clermont-Ferrand, its 
mentions of the company were extremely limited.  Particularly considering Michelin’s 
undoubtable presence in the town, it was even more of a statement that Le Petit Journal was 
nearly void of references to Michelin throughout the war, suggesting behavior that did not 
conform to Vichy’s regime.  
 
Michelin and the Collaboration Economy  
 Although Vichy placed great emphasis on its cultural agenda, Occupation put great stress 
on the economic sphere.  Specifically, adapting to a wartime economy necessitated changes on 
many levels.  Life at home changed greatly as most working-age men left for war.  Women took 
on different roles while the Vichy regime worked to reinforce traditional social values.  Above 
all, Vichy and the Reich desperately needed the complacent collaboration of the labor force. 
Adapting to a new social and economic landscape inherently put stress on the labor force as it 
was forced to comply.  Conversation surrounding the collaboration of the working population 
focused on the economic necessity of the situation, defining social collaboration, and reinforcing 
traditional social values amidst such change.  As the war continued in the years following the 
original economic arrangements made in the summer of 1940, companies such as Michelin came 
to understand their arrangement with German authorities as a means of survival, both for 
themselves as a company and for their workers.   
Following the establishment of the Vichy regime in July 1940 there was an immediate 
need for the French economy to adjust to and accommodate the needs of the Reich.  While 
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economic collaboration was mostly a complicated series of arrangements between the Vichy 
government, French firms, and the Reich, there was also a need to incorporate the labor that 
carried out these arrangements at the lowest level.70  After the establishment of the Vichy 
government, the French press called French citizens to adapt to the so-called new economy.  The 
first article on the front page of the August 26, 1940 Le Petit Journal was all about adjusting to 
the new economy.  The author stressed how the circumstances of war called for the French 
economy to immediately accommodate for new means of exchange, presumably with Germany.  
He emphasized the roles of key industries in facilitating the transition to the new collaborative 
economy between Vichy and the Reich.  Addressing private industry, including Michelin, the 
author wrote that they would focus on producing tools and materials that previously came from 
abroad.71  Although Michelin was not specifically producing materials, it was forced to adapt to 
these changes.  For Michelin, this meant that they had to use a different source of synthetic 
rubber.  Michelin and others eventually produced tires bade from buna, a synthetic rubber 
supplied by the Germans.72  Part of Michelin’s agreement with the Germans was that they gave 
up their stocks of raw rubber in exchange for essential cotton thread produced in German-
occupied northern France.73  Because of these arrangements, Michelin could continue to 
produce, a role they were encouraged to fully embrace to contribute to the greater German 
economy.  
As the original agreements between Vichy and the Reich lasted for several years, it 
became clear that the exchange of economic collaboration for company survival allowed firms 
like Michelin to keep their doors open.  Even though much of the outside western world was 
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inherently skeptical of collaboration in its involvement with the Reich, by the end of the war it 
was clear that economic collaboration had allowed many firms to stay open.  Writing in The New 
York Times in April 1944, Lansing Warren pointed out how economic collaboration had been a 
guarantee of survival for many French firms, including Michelin, as occupation had lasted 
several years by that point.  Warren described the basic process of collaboration for large 
industry, stating that firms “work on a definite contract for the German authorities.  The contract 
is for a stipulated amount of goods.  To fill it the French manufacturer receives from the 
Germans the raw materials that he needs.  His labor is assured.”74  With this understanding of 
how the basic process worked, Warren continued onto describe the uncertainty of Michelin’s 
operations, mentioning that the Clermont-Ferrand factory was recently bombed, and that it would 
likely remain shut until another contract was signed with the Reich.75  Writing nearly four years 
into the war, Warren published his article with an understanding of how economic deals with the 
Reich had allowed companies like Michelin to stay open.  Warren’s article expressed how both 
labor and management benefitted from this arrangement, which was Michelin’s aim all along.  
As they continued to renew their contracts with the Germans, Michelin guaranteed both its own 
success as well as protection for its workforce.    
Although it was Michelin management that signed official collaboration agreements with 
the Reich, it was labor that carried out the day to day manufacturing of products to be delivered 
to the Germans.  To bridge the gap between labor and management, Vichy sought to instill a 
sense of solidarity among all involved.  This level of collaboration that Vichy aspired to was the 
synthesis of many other ideals of collaboration—delivery of goods to the Reich, the application 
of values deemed appropriate by the Vichy government, and a level of understanding between 
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management and labor.  One July 1943 Le Petit Journal article took a stab at defining what was 
the “spirit of social collaboration.”  The author insisted upon the necessity of a reconciliation 
between labor and management.  He equated refusing the collaboration of these two groups with 
choosing civil war.76  This take on refusing collaboration as leading to civil war was a clear echo 
of the late 1930s at Michelin and in France.  Distancing the Vichy regime from the social turmoil 
of the Popular Front, this article sought to reinforce a sense of traditional social order which it 
was encouraging readers to find in the regime itself.  At Michelin, the rapprochement between 
management and labor came in the form of the reemergence of paternalism.     
 While a sense of solidarity between labor and management was necessary for production, 
it also spoke to the continued fear of labor turning to communism.  An article on social 
collaboration that appeared in the July 17, 1943 edition of Le Petit Journal told readers that they 
could either give into a regime of social collaboration, or else “communism will prevail.”77  The 
paper also reported on efforts in Clermont-Ferrand that specifically addressed the risk of 
communism.  A small article reported that local leaders met July 6, 1943 to address the fight 
against communism and reported that their efforts were advancing well.78  Given the political 
slant of Le Petit Journal, discussion of the fear of communism and labor spoke to the broader 
agenda of the Vichy regime.  While concerns over labor were no longer at the forefront of 
national politics as they were in the years leading up to the war, they were still closely linked to 
the ideology of Vichy in what one author described as Vichy’s “open hostility to the Left and 
Trade Unionism.”79  Although the arrangements of collaboration pushed aside questions over 
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collective organization at firms like Michelin, the Vichy years remained closely linked to the 
events of the late 1930s in this way.  
 
Mutual Survival    
While Vichy was putting forth a unified vision of Clermont-Ferrand for its own sake, 
there was another dynamic of solidarity at play in the town.  Moving past the conflict of the late 
1930s, the war marked the union of labor and capital once again at Michelin.  A return to 
previous times in many ways, this union was marked by a renewed sense of paternalism at 
Michelin.  Throughout the war, it was the firm’s paternalistic attitude towards its workforce that 
allowed for their respective survival.  As Lottman described in Michelin Men, the corporate 
leadership prioritized the continued employment of their workers to prevent their departure for 
forced labor.80  Aiming to maintain employment, a certain surface level of collaboration allowed 
for Michelin to obtain the raw materials it needed to continue production and safeguard 
employment.  Michelin’s own collaboration slowed down the departure of its workers for forced 
labor service.  In this regard, the question of labor at Michelin during the war was not a question 
of collaboration or resistance, but rather a mutual sense of dependency.  Just as labor relied upon 
the firm for continued employment to prevent departure to Germany, management too depended 
on the loyalty of its workforce to carry out its service to the Reich.  While wartime actions at 
Michelin have often fallen under the labels of collaboration or resistance, the larger point was 
that a renewed sense of cohesion between labor and management allowed for their collective 
survival that allowed Michelin to move forward in the years that followed the war.     
Michelin’s priority to maintain employment for its workers came into conflict with the 
question of German-imposed forced labor.  By 1943 the German economy was in need of fuel 
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and needed to look beyond Germany for labor.  A subject that pervaded all discussion of 
Michelin’s relationship with their workers throughout the war was the institution of forced labor 
first through the rélève and later on the service du travail obligatoire (STO).81  Although more 
informal arrangements for the provisions of labor existed earlier on in the war, the STO officially 
began in February 1943 as a means of both compulsory and forced labor to be provided to the 
Reich.  As Peter Davies discussed in his book Dangerous Liaisons: Collaboration and World 
War II, slightly less than four percent of the working population of France was exported to 
Germany for labor, approximately 800,000 people total by the end of the war.82  Employing 
roughly 10,000 workers in 1940, Michelin’s managing director, Robert Puiseux, prioritized the 
needs of the firms’ workers, protecting their jobs and stopping or delaying departure to 
Germany.83  Even though Michelin was working to prevent departure to Germany, it was the 
existence of institutions and arrangements like the STO that fuelled their behavior and grounded 
the renewed sense of paternalism at the firm. 
Even before laws specifying forced labor inscription were finalized, the Vichy 
government made several urgent requests of workers, continually insisting upon their 
cooperation and a sense of mutual sacrifice.  In the fall of 1942, the French press made several 
urgent pleas to workers.  The top of the front page of the October 21, 1942 Le Petit Journal 
emphasized the recruitment of manual labor with a transcribed speech from President Laval 
called “President Laval makes an urgent appeal to workers.”84  This urgent plea to workers’ 
cooperation at the same time formal structures of labor recruitment were coming into play was a 
continued attempt on the part of the Vichy government to exert social control over the direction 
                                                
81 STO was the forced enlistment and deportation of French workers sent to Germany during World War II.  
82 Davies, Dangerous Liaisons, 138. 
83 Lottman, Michelin Men, 184. 
84 “Le président Laval adresse un pressant appel aux ouvriers” from “Le président Laval adresse un pressant appel 
aux ouvriers,” Le Petit Journal, October 21, 1942, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k638046s/f1.item. 
 43 
of France under the Reich.  In this pressing appeal to labor, Laval emphasized the need to 
execute a policy of compromise with Germany and to unite behind the Vichy government and 
obey its orders, in this case be obedient workers and fulfill its unmet labor demands.  Near the 
end of the speech, Laval made a final request of the workers he was addressing.  He spoke 
directly to the labor force saying, “it is your task to take back with your tools what France lost 
for weapons.”85  Charged with the duty of reclaiming what had been taken from France, Laval 
recognized and stressed the importance of instilling a sense of solidarity with the workforce.  For 
Michelin, Laval’s appeal demonstrated the intense outside pressure for labor as part of life in 
occupied France.    
In the second half of February 1943, the number of workers departing Clermont-Ferrand 
for forced labor increased.86  Le Petit Journal at this time increasingly emphasized the 
application of the STO law and to whom it applied.  The paper’s insistence on the necessity of 
compliance indicated the tense atmosphere surrounding labor at that time.  While the paper did 
not delve into the specifics of departure for forced labor, its insistence upon obedience to the law 
indicated the sheer necessity for it.  Specifying that the law applied to all young men born 
between 1920 and 1922, the February 16, 1943 edition of the paper emphasized that the 
enforcement of forced labor was the application of a law created in September 1942.87  In the 
second half of February 1943, the majority of Le Petit Journal front pages included a feature on 
the application of the STO law.  In this context, the Vichy press was a direct reflection of the 
increased demands of the Reich.  For Michelin, these external pressures challenged their own 
operations as labor was a much needed commodity.    
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While the paper did not mention Clermont-Ferrand as a specific point of departure or as a 
target, it generally did not disclose such information for any town. There were no records within 
the scope of my research that showed an increase in the number of departures from Clermont-
Ferrand during the second half of February 1943. Nevertheless, fears surrounding the 
uncertainties of departure for STO service pervaded the French press at this time.  Given their 
unique relationship with their labor, Michelin’s corporate leaders stood between the Vichy 
government putting the forced labor law into action and average workers’ uncertainty over where 
the fulfillment of their STO service would take them. Visible in the discussions of fulfilling STO 
service was the fear of being required to complete this service in Germany.  On the front page of 
the February 24, 1943 Le Petit Journal was another article concerning the application of the STO 
law.  The clarifications this article offered to its readership sought to condemn the general belief 
that all labor service would be fulfilled in Germany.  The author wrote, “Despite these 
clarifications, certain rumors that foreign radios have tried to instill in popular opinion lead the 
public to believe that all young people called for service—except farmers—will be sent to 
Germany.  We repeat that nothing is more inaccurate.”88  In addition to this clarification, the 
paper specifically addressed which kinds of workers were fully exempt from being sent to 
Germany.  These workers included: coal miners, firefighters from the cities of Paris, Lyon, and 
Marseille, state police agents, SNCF (national railway) workers, and students who obtained a 
suspended call of duty.89  The nature of these precisions indicated a true fear for both the work 
the STO would entail and where workers would be sent.  As Le Petit Journal explained, 
Michelin workers were part of a larger category of workers that risked being sent to Germany if 
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called upon for STO service.  Therefore, as the risk of being sent to Germany materialized as 
labor institutions were formalized, Michelin continued a sense of paternalism towards its 
workers to hopefully prevent their departure.     
 As much as the institution of STO laws implied a personal responsibility to enlist if born 
between the given dates, conversation surrounding the application of the February 1943 law 
included the employers’ responsibility to get their workers to enlist.  Given that Michelin had 
provided cover for workers in order to avoid labor service, such orders on behalf of the Vichy 
government put the Michelin management in a difficult position.  Throughout the summer of 
1943, Le Petit Journal frequently included reminders to go to the town hall and fill out the 
required paperwork for inscription in the labor service.  In addition to the reminders the press 
gave to workers, it also warned employers of their own responsibility.  After refreshing its 
readership of the given terms of the labor law, the article alerted managers how they should 
encourage complacent behavior.  The article read, “the attention of commercial and industrial 
company heads is drawn to the liability that they incur or may incur in this regard.”90  By 
reminding company managers of the liability they exposed themselves to if they did not do all in 
their power to enlist their workers that are of age, the Vichy government sent a stern warning to 
them as being at risk.  In turn, this discussion of management’s responsibility in forced labor 
arrangements directly concerned the risk Michelin was exposing themselves to in providing 
cover for its workers.     
In fact, the type of risk the article alluded to was the same kind of activity Marcel 
Michelin was arrested for the same month as this article’s publication.  Born in 1886, Marcel’s 
father, André, cofounded the tire firm alongside his brother.  Marcel was actively involved in 
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Michelin operations his entire life and worked to create a sense of paternalism at the firm.  
During the war, Marcel was the most active resistant in the Michelin family, providing refuge in 
the forest for workers at risk of being sent to Germany and organizing local resistance groups.91  
In understanding the activity that led to Marcel’s arrest and considering the responsibility the 
Vichy government placed on employers, it was clear that the undercover activity at Michelin 
went unnoticed by the censored press until his arrest.92  Although conversations surrounding the 
compliance of the working French population to fulfill their labor obligations focused on their 
compliance to foster a sense of unity, one must also bring employers’ risk and responsibility into 
consideration.  Considering the Michelin’s actions alongside the urgent pleas of the Vichy 
government communicated in the press, it was clear that workers’ actions in fulfilling their STO 
requirements and the risk employers exposed themselves to were inherently intertwined.    
 While the Vichy regime worked hard to create and maintain a unified vision of Clermont-
Fernand inside of France, it necessarily excluded any mention of activity that was in any way 
subversive to the stability of Occupation.  In the case of Michelin, this vision of Clermont-
Ferrand omitted any mention of resistance activity within the town and at Michelin.  It was only 
in looking at moments reported in the paper with acquired knowledge that it was possible to 
consider how events reported on in Le Petit Journal related to the other side of the story.  One 
moment such an understanding came to light was when the Michelin factory was bombed in 
March 1944.  The night of the 16th and 17th of March, 1944, Royal Air Force Lancaster planes 
targeted the factories of Clermont-Ferrand, including Michelin.  Dropping six-ton bombs called 
“factory busters,” the RAF bombers succeeded in severely damaging the Michelin factory.93  In 
the days following the bombings, both Le Petit Journal and the American press commented on 
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the destruction caused by the attacks.  The front page of the March 18, 1944 edition of Le Petit 
Journal reported in great detail on the Anglo-American bombings.  It stated that the first bombs 
dropped at 10:50pm, subsequently destroying many homes and housing structures in the 
neighborhood, including workers’ housing.  This first report estimated around 20 deaths and 40 
injuries.94  However, absent from this first report was any information on damaged 
manufacturing facilities, rather focusing on the people affected by the attacks and how their 
situation was being handled.  The same day, an article in The New York Times detailed specific 
damages to the Michelin factory.  Their article titled “Enemy Blasted From West” reported that 
the RAF attacked the Michelin Rubber Company factory at Clermont-Ferrand, noting that it was 
one of the most productive rubber producers in Europe.  The author indicated that the precision 
of the bombing was possible as the Michelin factories “had been ringed by flares” and that pilots 
reported seeing the target perfectly outlined.95  Neither the Michelin plant as a target nor the 
perfectly outlined target were mentioned in Le Petit Journal’s accounts of the attacks.  The 
organized nature and precision of the bombings suggested the possibility that someone on the 
ground in Clermont-Ferrand aided the RAF bombers in the execution of their attacks. While 
sources beyond Le Petit Journal suggested the specific involvement of Michelin in these air 
raids, the interest of Vichy was in portraying the RAF bombings as an allied attack against the 
town.  For the sake of a unified Vichy regime in Clermont-Ferrand, the vested interest was in 
creating a sense of unity among the townspeople rather than creating a divide between the town 
and Michelin.    
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While there was no clear evidence of how these attacks were carried out with such 
precision, Lottman pointed out that the air attack could have been avoided.  He wrote that Henry 
Ingrand, the combat movement chief of Mouvement Unis de Résistance (Unified Movements of 
the Resistance) of Auvergne, had been in contact with the British special intelligence.  Thanks to 
his Michelin contacts, Ingrand met with Michelin’s general manager to explain that if Michelin 
workers could help sabotage the factory on the ground, an air raid could be avoided.  The 
manager’s answer to Ingrand’s request was no.96 While the firm may not have aided in helping 
local resistance leaders orchestrate sabotage on the ground, members of the company carried out 
other acts of resistance.  Most resistance-specific activity at Michelin revolved around Marcel 
Michelin, son of co-founder André.  Marcel created a refuge for factory workers 20 miles outside 
of the town, and two of his sons, Philippe and Hubert, fled France and joined the Royal Air 
Force as pilots.97  Although it is alleged that Michelin management would not agree to help 
orchestrate factory sabotage as Lottman suggested, the family remained resistant through an 
array of activity despite their surface level of collaboration with the Reich.  While it is clear that 
many of these details of their acts of resistance are only clear long after the fact through 
biographical work on the Michelin family and other outside sources, these happenings at 
Michelin worked to contradict the very sense of cohesion Vichy was aiming to create.      
The war marked several inevitable changes to life at Michelin and in Clermont-Ferrand.  
As Michelin accepted the terms of economic collaboration with the Reich, it found itself in many 
ways at the center of the regime Vichy was trying to create.  However, in private, Michelin 
returned to its past sense of paternalism to define its relationship with its workers.  While 
Michelin inevitable straddled the labels of collaborator and resistant during the war, it was not 
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these terms that defined the company during the war.  Rather, it was the dynamics of Michelin’s 
longer company history.  As the war put a pause to larger labor movements, it brought to light 
the paternalism Michelin had spent decades working to establish.  The reemergence of this 
practice during the war allowed for the survival of Michelin as a company and its workers as 
individuals.  Yet, the security wartime paternalism provided would not last.  
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Chapter Three 
Michelin in the Aftermath of the War 
 
 
 
On June 6, 1944, Michelin landed in Normandy.  American officers each landed on the 
beaches of Normandy with a Guide Michelin in hand.98  Even after nearly four years of 
collaboration with the Germans, Michelin remained a respected authority among the Allied 
forces.99  Michelin did not wither away during the years of German occupation.  As Michelin got 
back to work, life at Michelin was defined in two ways.  First of all, Michelin had to grapple 
with the implications of the war.  As a family, Michelin mourned tragic losses.  As a company, 
Michelin dealt with the wartime labels of collaboration and resistance as they tried to redefine 
their company identity.  Beyond the family tragedy of the war, Michelin was in this latter respect 
at odds with labor once again.  Even though Michelin’s paternalism was a lasting characteristic 
of the manufacturer, it was seen in a more positive light throughout the war.  In the years that 
followed, labor organized itself in ways that were strikingly similar the the years leading up to 
the war.  It came back under fire in the years that followed.  Rather than a complete departure 
from the past, the postwar period brought to light lasting continuities in Michelin’s relationship 
with labor both in terms of Michelin’s own paternalism and labor’s response to it.     
Primary sources for the examination of Michelin after Liberation were limited and 
different from what newspapers were published before and during the war.  The established 
French press was heavily controlled and censored during German occupation.  Above all, 
examining the French press before and after the war presented the problem of continuity.100  
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While L’Humanité was still in publication and wielded a wide influence in the postwar period, 
access to its archives for this period is limited.  Given these limitations in examining the press 
within France for this period, the international press including The Times and The New York 
Times provided the best glimpse into what was happening with Michelin and in Clermont-
Ferrand at this time.  Looking at labor unrest through these international sources indicated a 
larger concern for the economic recovery of France and for the general fear of communism in the 
early years of the Cold War. In the 1930s these fears focused on the threat of fascism and war in 
Europe.  After the war, these fears spoke to the imminent fear of communism taking hold in 
Europe.   
 
Damages of the War 
 Clermont-Ferrand was liberated August 27, 1944 through the work of the French Forces 
of the Interior (FFI).101  News of the liberation of Clermont-Ferrand reached the United States a 
few days later.  An article in the August 31st New York Times detailed the German retreat, 
attributing the success in Clermont-Ferrand to the direction of General Koenig and the work of 
the FFI.102  In their retreat, the Germans destroyed the Crouël powder keg and the Place des 
Bughes.103  These minimal damages aside, there was one incredibly important absence in the 
liberation of Clermont-Ferrand—executions.  The FFI’s directions for the liberation of Clermont-
Ferrand forbade executions.104  Across France, executions during liberation were a physical 
reminder of the shame associated with having collaborated with the Germans.  In France, 9,000 
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collaborators were executed during the liberation campaign.  1,500 more were executed after 
trial, and 40,000 were sentenced to time in prison.  Most of these executions and trials focused 
on the most visible members of the Vichy regime.  In general, civil servants and businessmen 
were spared, often by making claims that they were simultaneously working for the resistance.105 
While the absence of executions would have likely excluded Michelin because of their claims to 
the resistance, their absence was important in that it allowed Michelin to escape the label of 
collaborator from the beginning.   
 Just as Michelin was fortunate to escape executions both during liberation and in its 
aftermath, they were also spared from any formal judicial proceedings.  No formal case was ever 
made against Michelin for its wartime collaboration.  Lottman commented that the archives he 
examined “contain no files on the Michelin family hierarchy or on any of its non-family 
directors, suggesting that a case could not have been made against anyone in charge.”106  This 
demonstrated that although Michelin did collaborate in a number of ways, their collaboration 
activities were not important to the purification of France that followed the war.  In its identity as 
a collaborator, Michelin escaped both executions during liberation and later trials.  The fact that 
no formal case was brought forward against Michelin does not mean that the firm’s collaboration 
with the Reich was not recognized.  Rather, as seen in the previous chapter, many argued and 
remembered how Michelin’s surface level of collaboration saved the departure of many of its 
workers for forced labor service in Germany.  Remembering Michelin in this way made for an 
easy connection between collaboration and resistance, with the focus being on the latter.   
 Despite their apparent collaboration, the Michelin family risked their own lives to carry 
out resistance activities.  The most telling tragedy of this time period for the Michelins was the 
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arrest, internment, and death of Marcel, the most notable activist in the family.  Arrested 
alongside his son in July 1943, Marcel died at the Ohrdruf concentration camp of pneumonia in 
January 1945.  His son, Jacques, survived and would be liberated from the Flossenburg camp by 
General Patton in April 1945.107  In addition to the arrests of Marcel and Jacques, a 1972 article 
cited the internment of another family member at Ravensbruck.108  Two of Marcel’s sons, 
Philippe and Hubert, were Royal Air Force pilots in Britain during the war.  Resistance groups 
organized by Marcel reached London and Algiers. 109  While such tragedy was exponential in 
Europe, news of these Michelin family tragedies reached the international press.  The New York 
Times reported on the death of Marcel in a camp nearly three months afterwards.110  Even though 
much of the Michelin family’s resistance activity ended in horrible tragedy like the death of 
Marcel in internment, his legacy lived on, a legacy fueled perhaps by the need to demonstrate 
Michelin’s contribution to the Resistance.   
 
Back to Work  
The war cast a long shadow on the years to come at Michelin.  Alongside the rest of 
Europe, the postwar period was a time of reconstruction at Michelin, both in terms of a physical 
and an economic recovery.  Although the war was over, a different sort of battle was 
beginning—the battle of production.  In the postwar period, steady production at Michelin was 
an absolute necessity to ensure the future of the firm, France, and Europe.  The first step in 
getting back to work was repairing the damages of the March 1944 bombings.  The Allied 
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bombing nearly destroyed one of Michelin’s largest factories in Clermont-Ferrand.  Success of 
Michelin postwar was dependent on their ability to produce, which in turn rested on their ability 
to rebuild the damaged factory.  Fortunately, by the end of 1946 the plant was rebuilt and 
producing more than it ever had.  Given that France was in a state of economic despair, Michelin 
ensured their postwar success right away by working with American armed forces.  Part of their 
program for economic recovery was producing tires for American troops still fighting elsewhere 
in Europe.111  This immediate plan to recover represented Michelin’s direction towards the 
future.  Almost immediately, they had gone from producing for the Germans to producing for the 
Americans.   
Alongside the rebuilding of the damaged factory, Michelin got back to business working 
on a product that would come to define its postwar success.  Michelin had long strived to 
develop and introduce a new tire to the market.  The development of “pneu X,” Michelin’s radial 
tire was crucial to their postwar economic success.112  Coming out of the war, Lottman argued 
that the development and production of their new tire “confirmed that Michelin possessed ideas, 
processes and machinery that others did not have.”113  While the tire was not introduced to the 
mass market until June 1949, its development was at the center of Michelin after 1945.  It was a 
mark of innovation that carried Michelin into a new era.  Above all, Michelin’s new radial tire 
was a symbolic victory for the firm.  After years of struggling to perfect its design and the 
interruption of the war, the launch of the radial tire signified that Michelin was back on top.  
Even though “pneu X” represented the sense of innovation that would carry Michelin into 
the future, its development perpetuated preexisting stereotypes of the firm.  The sense of secrecy 
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that surrounded the development of the new radial tire preserved the image of Michelin as a 
secretive organization.  “Secretive” had long been a term used to criticize Michelin’s corporate 
behavior.114  Criticism for being secretive was not the only mark of continuity that went with 
Michelin into the future.  The labor conflict that defined Michelin in the years leading up to the 
war made its return in the years that followed.   
Just as Michelin was getting back to work, so were trade unions.  Even though the end of 
the war brought a sense of peace to life in Clermont-Ferrand, it did not mean peace with labor.  
In the years following the war, General Confederation of Labor (CGT) membership skyrocketed.  
CGT membership postwar topped numbers of the Popular Front era.  The CGT went from 1.5 
million members in 1939 to a record high of 6 million members in 1946.115  The revived activity 
of the CGT at the firm demonstrated the continued interest of labor in the firm.  While the war 
had paused the activity of organized labor for obvious reasons, its revival in the postwar period 
illustrated the endurance of organized labor at Michelin.  In the years that followed the end of the 
war, Michelin workers continued to organize in ways that were strikingly similar to the Popular 
Front era, setting the stage for labor at Michelin in the years to come.  
At Michelin and elsewhere, labor demands came through the company chapter of the 
CGT.  The CGT wielded a wide influence, as it was a national confederation of unions that 
operated on a very local level.  While it was the same institution that orchestrated strikes at 
Michelin in the late 1930s and late 1940s, the CGT was not in the same position after the war as 
it had been in the Popular Front years.  As France struggled to rebuild itself after years of 
German occupation, steady production was key.  While the CGT clearly had their own agenda, 
vying for better wages and conditions (mostly their gains that were lost when the Popular Front 
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fell from power), they were also part of a larger picture that required them to use their 
organizational power to increase production.  As George Ross described in his book Workers 
and Communists in France, the main goal of the CGT after liberation was to win the “battle of 
production.”116  While the war in Europe was wrapping up, a new battle was beginning in 
France, one for economic recovery.  Even though the CGT had its own goals, the largest goal 
was the recovery of France.  One slogan of the CGT at this time was “work hard first, then ask 
for concessions.”117  As the head of the CGT indicated with their slogans, they were putting their 
own agenda behind national production, choosing to first demonstrate the importance of their 
role in the economic recovery of France.  This arrangement of communists (the CGT included) 
working alongside the coalition government lasted until May 1947 when the communists 
proclaimed their support for a strike at Renault and were subsequently excluded from the 
government.118  This marked a shift in how labor would proceed at Michelin, as there had been 
no major strike movements between 1944 and May 1947.119  
In many ways, the June 1948 strikes picked up where the 1947 strikes left off.  Following 
the failure of the 1947 strikes, the CGT planned a new round of militant strikes for the spring and 
summer of 1948.120  In this context, strikes at Michelin in June 1948 gained the attention of the 
world.  Activity at Michelin in Clermont-Ferrand gained the attention of several international 
newspapers including The New York Times, The Times of London, and The Boston Globe.  On 
the morning of June 16, 1948, police intervened to disrupt sit-down strikers that were occupying 
a Bergougnan rubber factory in Clermont-Ferrand after union heads refused an offer from 
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management to increase hourly wages by two francs rather than the six francs they demanded.  
Upon this announcement 180 workers occupied the Michelin factory, leading to forces of the 
Interior Ministry and local police to intervene.  After the arrival of government forces, The New 
York Times reported that the strikers “hurled bottles of sulphuric acid and tear-gas grenades at 
the Government forces, which replied principally with tear gas.121  The New York Times reported 
that as of June 17th 50,000 workers were joining in solidarity with the Michelin workers, and that 
because of CGT action the strike could very well increase to 100,000 by June 18th.122  In addition 
to the coverage in The New York Times, The Times of London also reported on the June 16th 
events in Clermont-Ferrand.  Their coverage added that the strike had so far led to over 100 
injuries on both sides, leaving 30 policemen in danger of losing their sight because of the 
sulphuric acid used by the strikers.123  
 The language and subject matter of the initial reports in the international press illustrated 
not only the continued conflict with organized labor after the war but also the general fear of 
communism.  The actions of both the strikers and the intervening forces were typical of the time 
period.  The CGT planned for their strikes to be militant.  Likewise, brutal police repression was 
typical. This pattern of workers’ actions and police response became clear quickly when one 
looks at the more extended coverage of the Michelin strike.  
By the following day, the strike had spread far beyond Clermont-Ferrand and even 
outside of France.  The June 18, 1948 Boston Globe reported that the original strike had now 
spread to include 347,000 workers in England, Belgium, and France.  As the movement spread to 
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halt production beyond France, the fear of the rise of communism only worsened.  The Boston 
Globe reported that officials feared that the strike might be the “beginning of a long-heralded 
Communist ‘summer offensive’ against the coalition government of Premier Robert 
Schuman.”124  Elsewhere, strikes were stopping work as well.  Amidst reports of the labor 
situation in France, The Times reported on a workers’ strike at the London docks.  Over 10,000 
workers had stopped work on 80 ships.125  Even given their own crisis at home, strikes that 
began in Clermont-Ferrand spread to such a scale that gained attention across the globe.  While 
understanding that a communist-led organization was capable of garnering such momentum 
while causing disruption to production, the international press demonstrated the need to prevent 
such activity from spreading.    
While a strike of this magnitude was not limited to Michelin during this time period, the 
persistence of massive strikes at Michelin represented a continuation with the years prior to 
German occupation and demonstrated a collective fear of communism in the postwar political 
climate.  Similar to labor movements of the late 1930s, strikes of the late 1940s brought 
production and services to a stop.  Other than halting production at Michelin and other factories, 
the New York Times report of the strikes in Clermont-Ferrand cited that department stores did not 
open, local papers were not published, trains did not run, and public transit did not function as 
normal.126  In addition to the political threat labor movement represented, they imposed serious 
economic costs that the postwar economy of France simply did not allow for.  A report in the 
June 20, 1948 New York Times cited economic concerns ranging from military expenditures to 
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possible price raises to the imposing costs of government subsidized industries.127  While 
production was of particular importance in the context of economic recovery, the New York 
Times report illustrated that life could not continue on as normal.  Akin to the strikes of the 
Popular Front era, the strikes that began in Clermont-Ferrand in June 1948 had implications far 
beyond the town itself.  Labor activity at Michelin and beyond tested the economic stability of 
France to emerge from the war and interrupted daily life just as people were finding peace in the 
aftermath of war.   
Above all, the attention the movement gained in Clermont-Ferrand and elsewhere 
demonstrated a political climate extremely hostile to the rise of communism.  In this particular 
case, officials around the world feared the capacity of communist leadership to gain momentum 
and attention beginning from one isolated incident.  By June 19th, The New York Times was 
reporting that security forces were leaving Clermont-Ferrand.  The same article mentioned that 
the largest effect of the strike movement in Clermont-Ferrand was the sympathy strike at 
Michelin.  The author noted that at Michelin, 13,500 workers had seized the Michelin plant 
demanding better seniority bonuses.128  Even though the conflict did not begin at Michelin, 
workers’ reaction at Michelin exhibited their connection to the larger labor movement.  
Discontent over seniority bonuses further revealed that labor at Michelin was not appeased and 
continued to voice their demands for better conditions.  At Michelin and beyond, actions in 
support of this strike and others demonstrated the capabilities of the labor movement to disrupt 
actions in France and create a fear of communism around the world. 
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New Communist Fears  
Whereas in the interwar era communist fears expressed fears leading up to the war, in the 
postwar climate, the non-communist world perceived large, organized labor movements as a 
threat to their way of existence.  In France, many of these immediate labor conflicts occurred 
while the Fourth Republic was not yet firmly established.  Until May 1947, the three major 
forces of wartime resistance, the Christian democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire 
(MRP), the Communist Party (PCF), and the Socialist party (SFIO), worked together under the 
banner of tripartism.  Together, these forces implemented a postwar agenda focusing on 
nationalizing key industries, reaching full employment, and increasing benefits of the welfare 
state.129  However, by May 1937 it had become clear that a lasting union between business and 
labor was not possible.  Even as the Communist party was pushed aside after May 1947, the 
government itself was in a fragile state.  Communist forces remained the primary opposition to 
De Gaulle’s coalition government.  However, now on the outside of the government, the 
Communists increasingly turned to strikes orchestrated by the CGT to express their position.  
Beyond the political situation in France, the larger concern at stake was the rise of communism 
in Europe.   
Although Clermont-Ferrand was removed from the central government in Paris, clashes 
between communist and Gaullist forces reached the town.  The March 15, 1948 New York Times 
reported a riot between Gaullists and Communists in Clermont-Ferrand the previous day.  
Communists interrupted a speech at a meeting of de Gaulle supporters in Clermont-Ferrand’s 
main square, causing local police to eventually intervene and stop the riot.130  This incident in a 
smaller provincial town gained attention across the world because of the conflict it represented.  
                                                
129 Hewlett, Modern French Politics, 46. 
130 “Gaullists, Reds Clash: Several Hurt in Political Rioting—Police Disperse 2 Groups,” The New York Times, 
March 15, 1948, http://search.proquest.com/docview/108312041?accountid=8505. 
 61 
Throughout France, Gaullist forces were barely holding onto control.  Clashes like this isolated 
incident in Clermont-Ferrand represented a broader interest in the political stability of France 
and Europe as a whole, particularly against the threat of communism.  
The June 1948 strikes that began in Clermont-Ferrand and spread throughout Europe 
illustrated not only the remobilization of labor at Michelin but also the larger fear of communism 
in Europe.  These strikes served to rationalize fears of communism taking hold in Europe as the 
international community watched this fear become a reality in Germany.  Following these 
strikes, The New York Times reported how communist forces were testing the strength of the 
French government.  The author of this report noted how remarkable it was that this situation 
gained strength and attention far beyond France amidst serious problems in Germany.131  The 
situation in Germany was falling apart, leading up to the Berlin Blockade, which began June 
24th.  As Soviet forces limited access to the eastern zone, the threat of communism became much 
more tangible to the rest of the world.  The New York Times made a point of how the 
combination of labor disputes and the situation in Germany was leading to a genuine fear of 
communism and the threat it posed to western democracies like France.  While the rise of the 
labor movement and the situation in Berlin were not directly related to each other, the timing of 
event brought to the forefront fears over communism that the western world had following the 
war.   
Although postwar fears of communism and labor movements were not the same as the 
ones at the end of the 1930s, both occurred in political climates where leftist forces were, in the 
case of the late 1930s, the governing power, and, in the case of the postwar situation, a viable 
threat and alternative.  As France and the rest of the world watch communism take its hold in 
Germany, leaders feared for the future of their own countries.  Because these fears were 
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materializing elsewhere in Europe, people worried that the same could happen in France.  As 
communism was clearly at the root of the June 1948 strikes that began in Clermont-Ferrand and 
quickly spread, its power to interrupt daily life and to threaten social order were clear.  
After reaching its climax with a one-hour general strike on June 19th, the labor movement 
calmed down quickly.  Amidst reports contextualizing the labor disputes in Clermont-Ferrand 
with other threats of labor and communist power, the June 20, 1948 New York Times claimed 
that Clermont-Ferrand was finally “at peace.”  The article stated that strikes in the Bergougnen, 
Michelin, and Dunlop rubber factories “appear to have been settled, at least temporarily, during a 
series of secret negotiations between the management, labor and the Government.”132   
Although the report included a resolution, the nature of the resolution was fragile and 
temporary.  As Michelin worked to ensure its postwar success through new products and 
increased production, labor’s support was more important than ever.  Throughout the end of the 
1940s and 1950s the CGT orchestrated strikes that were capable of grinding normal activities to 
a halt.  Nearly ten years after the wide press coverage of the June 1948 strikes, The Times 
continued to report on the action of the CGT in France, and in Clermont-Ferrand.  The May 28, 
1958 Times reported on a strike organized once again by the CGT with the paralyzing effect of 
halting train, bus, and metro services in Paris.  The article noted that in Clermont-Ferrand, strikes 
organized by the CGT and Christian unions had effectively stopped production at Michelin, 
leaving 19,000 workers in Clermont-Ferrand idle.133  Ten years apart, strikes organized by the 
CGT remained able to disrupt daily life and continued to be recurring events in French postwar 
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life.  As this trajectory continued and continues today, labor relations still shape even 
international conversations surrounding Michelin, for it is Michelin’s particular relationship with 
its workforce that has left a lasting impression on the firm’s trajectory as well as the outside 
world.   
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Chapter Four 
Michelin’s Lasting Memory  
 
 
 
“The deeper structures of French society did not disintegrate as a result of the Vichy crisis.”134 
 
 
 
The deeper structures that defined life at Michelin did not disappear.  A defining sense of 
identity remained through the Popular Front, the damages of war, and the uncertain years that 
followed.  While Rousso’s analysis clearly addressed the Vichy years in particular, at Michelin 
the story of continuity was much larger, speaking to a company history influenced by events of 
the twentieth century but withstanding the test of time.  
While labor has certainly left its mark on French contemporary life, it was the war that 
marked the largest shift in the historical memory of past events.  While the memory of war has 
evolved over time, the treatment of labor was influenced by the events of May 1968 when France 
was again debilitated by a round of strikes that captured the attention of the world in a greater 
way than the strikes of the Popular Front era.  Writing of memory in postwar France in his 
famous book The Vichy Syndrome, Henry Rousso described the impact of May 1968 on French 
history when he wrote, “In May 1968 a generation noisily proclaimed its repudiation of a certain 
type of society and therefore, implicitly, of a certain vision of its history.”135  Therefore, not only 
did the events of May 1968 mark a new reference point for protest and disruption in 
contemporary France, it also marked a cultural divide in the treatment of the memory of World 
War II.  Aside from the memory of war, the question Rousso raised brought into consideration 
the memory of labor as well.  In this manner, Rousso suggested that the popular memory of labor 
was inherently marked by the events of 1968 in more ways than the Popular Front.  The larger 
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consideration of labor and Michelin does to some extent go along with this divide; 1968 did 
mark a generational shift in which the new generation viewed labor not in comparison to the 
Popular Front but instead to 1968.  Yet, while memory of the war never disappeared, the history 
of Michelin was more about long-term continuities and less so about the break of the war or of 
1968.  Therefore, even though the war and later on 1968 marked important turning points in the 
collective French memory, the more important story of labor and management at Michelin was 
the lasting trajectories that continued in spite of these shifts.  
Applying academic theory on memory to one corporate history presented its challenges in 
that changes at one company were a much more focused lens of study than broader questions of 
labor and World War II.  Although my research extended beyond Michelin in the 
contextualization of labor and events of the Second World War, the treatment of memory always 
came back to how it related to life at Michelin.  Similar to the methods used in previous chapters, 
I contend here that it is possible, drawing on Rousso and others, to interrogate the memory of 
war, corporation, and labor at Michelin by looking at conversations in the international press.  
Within these snippets of life at Michelin seen in the press, it was possible to examine how such 
reports draw on or shy away from past history of the firm.  While these press sources did not 
always address specific events including wartime tragedies and past conflict with labor, the more 
important focus was the long-term continuities at Michelin that endured amidst a rapidly 
changing global context.   
 
A Timeline for Memory  
Before considering the treatment of memories of war and labor at Michelin, it is 
important to first understand the roots of memory in the time period immediately following the 
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war.  Rousso’s division of memory focused on recognizing broader time periods that categorized 
certain concerns or interests of their time and, for the purpose of my thesis, the timeline he 
established allows for a better contextualization of events surrounding Michelin since liberation. 
Rousso categorized four different time periods in the evolution of the trauma inflicted by the 
Vichy syndrome.  1944 to 1954 consisted largely of mourning.  In the second phase from 1954 to 
1971Vichy became less controversial.  The third period from 1971 to 1974 shattered the Gaullist 
myth of the whole nation as resistant.  The fourth phase, which continues to the present, focuses 
on the question of occupation.136   Contextualizing primary sources with the work of authors 
such as Rousso allowed to contextualize particular moments reported in the press amidst other 
cultural changes in treatment. 
Henry Rousso categorized the period from 1944 to 1954 as one of “unfinished 
mourning,” a decade that focused primarily on the events of Liberation and Reconstruction.137  
This decade was a time focused on traditional grieving, for the loss of family and friends, and 
coming to terms with the internal crises of political instability and economic recovery France 
was facing.  The French people first had to deal with reconciling the behavior of the Vichy 
government, not to mention the question of collaboration.  As France first began to grapple with 
these questions of grief and recovery, Charles De Gaulle exerted his own treatment of the events 
of the previous five years in a way that focused on commemorating, rather than remembering, 
World War II.  In his book Divided Memory, Olivier Wieviorka focused on French remembrance 
of World War II over time.  Wieviorka identified how De Gaulle strove to identify France as 
victorious in the conflict, distancing his own Free France from the Vichy regime, and reducing 
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the conflict to an eternal Franco-German rivalry.138  Thus, the memory of the war began to take 
form in the context of the top-down focus on demonstrating that France was a victorious nation. 
The persistence of strikes and labor conflict during this time period from 1944 to 1954 
illustrated the continued power of the Communist party to influence life in France.  In the case of 
Michelin, and elsewhere, labor continued to be an influencing factor in the activity of the 
company.  As much as De Gaulle represented a France that said no to German occupation, his 
vision for the future of France greatly differed from that of the Communist party and their 
remembrance of the war.  Thus, as debates over the treatment of memory were beginning to take 
shape tension arose between the Gaullist vision of the past decade and that of the Communist 
party.  At Michelin, the initial question of memory of the war brought into question an age-old 
question of labor at the firm as communist groups continued to voice their demands.   
 
The Shadow of the War 
Apparent in many more ways than the memories of labor and corporate behavior is the 
memory of Michelin’s activity during the war.  The war, and its memory, influenced life at 
Michelin alongside the rest of France.  Aside from the collective memory Rousso discussed in its 
application to France as a whole, there is the particularity of the war at Michelin that 
encompassed both collaboration and resistance.  This specific memory of what happened at 
Michelin during the war has had a lasting impact in how it related to patterns of behavior that 
have continued long after the war.      
As Michelin’s behavior during the war encompassed both collaboration and resistance, 
they are two separate entities to remember.  While it was easier to talk about how its resistance 
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activity was remembered, the memory of its collaboration was not as obvious.  Immediately after 
the war, Michelin was not identified as a collaborator.  Writing in Michelin Men, Herbert 
Lottman commented that in his own research, there was no archival evidence suggesting there 
was a case to be made against Michelin management for their collaboration during the war.139  
Considering Michelin as a collaborator with the Germans, much of the rhetoric surrounding this 
topic focused on how their production for the Germans saved lives.  Writing about Michelin after 
the war, Christian Lamy noted in his article “Autour de Michelin: Mémoires” that after the war it 
was part of the collective memory in Clermont-Ferrand that employment at Michelin saved 
people from departure to Germany.140  This attitude towards Michelin’s collaboration with the 
Reich has continued over time.  Thinking about the postwar memory of Michelin’s collaboration 
during the war, it was largely accepted that Michelin’s collaboration allowed them to carry out 
resistance activities and prevented countless workers from having to fulfill forced labor service 
in Germany.     
Largely speaking, Michelin’s resistance activity was part of the conversation when 
highlighting the firm’s history.  As the conversation sometimes recognized their collaboration, it 
focused more on how Michelin resisted.  One way these memories were discussed was 
allegations of sabotaging products destined for Germany.  One such claim was that factory 
workers fabricated rubber that purposely did not hold at low temperatures.141  While the claims 
about sabotage remain disputed, other resistance activities of Michelin employees were widely 
recognized.  Marcel, the family member who died in a German camp was recognized as a 
resistance leader soon after the end of the war, and other accounts of Michelin detailed the 
involvement of various family members.  Another allegation was that Michelin was frequently 
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either late or behind on production.142  While the press recognized and applauded Michelin for 
these activities, the memory of these activities was more consistent than other aspects of 
occupation.  Even though many discussions of Michelin’s resistance activity during the war 
celebrated the firm for what they were able to do in the face of German occupation, they were 
also often critiqued later on for continuing the same behaviors.  While the sense of secrecy and 
paternalism surrounding the firm were seen as good things during the war, they were the very 
behaviors the corporation drew criticism for later on.     
 
Labor’s Persistence  
On one hand, as labor struggles continued to be a defining factor of the Michelin 
corporation, the continuation of these issues made it less apparent that discussion of the company 
would address their past history with labor conflict.  On the other hand, the lack of such 
conversations did not mean that the past was not important.  Rather, the visibility of long-term 
continuities vis-à-vis labor demonstrated a sense of permanence in Michelin’s corporate behavior 
and their relationship with labor.  As labor disruptions served as a point of continuity in the 
understanding of life in postwar France, strikes remained a focal point of the international press 
for discussing Michelin.  In the aftermath of 1968, France had a new point of reference in its 
collective memory of labor.  Therefore, as the outside looked to the question of labor at Michelin 
in the years following 1968, their perspective was more marked by the more recent events rather 
than past events which Michelin had had a more central role in.   
Due to the continued strength of labor, seen primarily through the Communist party and 
the local influence of the CGT, Michelin continued to face the influence of labor in ways similar 
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to how it had in the late 1930s as well as after the war.  Different instances discussing actions of 
labor at Michelin illustrated how organized labor continued to be part of the conversation, 
however in ways that differed from the past.  A first notable difference was that the role of 
national labor organizations was not as present as it was leading up to the war and in the years 
immediately afterwards.  Even in discussion of strikes and other union conflicts the role of the 
CGT or specific labor organizations was not discussed.  An account in the October 15, 1973 New 
York Times discussed Michelin’s plans to examine plans for the modernization of its plants with 
unions.  Although the report addressed unions in both France and Italy, it did not mention 
specific union names or goals.143  Whereas reports of the late 1930s or late 1940s discussed the 
actions of the CGT at Michelin in relation to other organized strike efforts, this sort of 
recollection was no longer the case.  Ross argued that from 1947 onwards, workers and the 
organizations that represented them were excluded from conversations about modernization.144  
As they were left voiceless in the government, strikes remained their only means of voicing an 
opinion.  That was not to say though that the CGT and the PCF were no longer influential in 
French life.  Rather, the strikes of May and June 1968 confirmed once again the direction of the 
CGT.  Writing on the perspective of both the PCF and the CGT post-1968, George Ross argued 
that “the events of 1968 were experienced as confirmation of the correctness of strategic 
directions set out earlier.”145  In this way, the success of labor in 1968 continued and intensified 
the ways in which labor continued to influence life in France.  Although the immediate aftermath 
of the Popular Front was often remembered as a legacy of disappointment and failure, the 
persistence of labor in moments like 1968 spoke to a long-term continuity in French life.  In this 
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way, May 1968 built upon and intensified this continuity at Michelin and elsewhere.  Whereas 
1968 represented a new moment for remembering the war, for the history of labor it solidified 
organizational success of the CGT.      
While the organization and memory of labor inevitably drew upon past labor movements, 
the discussion of labor in the moment did not seem to focus on past events at all.  This makes a 
degree of sense given the needs of the postwar world.  Michelin, alongside the rest of Europe, 
moved towards a more centralized and integrated economy in the years following World War II.  
The implications of labor disruptions at Michelin spread far beyond Clermont-Ferrand.  In the 
years following the war, Michelin alongside the rest of the world moved towards a more 
centralized way of doing business in three different ways—inside France itself, within the 
European community, and in the context of globalization.  While all three impacted how 
Michelin operated, the story of globalization is most important to Michelin in the context of this 
thesis.  Within France this story of globalization was about France asserting it place in the global 
economy.  At Michelin, it was about their continued operations elsewhere in Europe and their 
expansion across the globe. 
In October 1972, The Times detailed labor disputes at Michelin that began in Clermont-
Ferrand and spread throughout Europe.  The report illustrated how unrest for Michelin 
throughout Europe began two weeks prior in Clermont-Ferrand when 130 workers at the wire-
gauze workshop protested management’s instructions for increased production.146  While this 
report did not blame the initial causes of the strike on one group or union, as was the case in both 
the prewar and immediate postwar periods, it does represent a continuity in the ability of one 
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small group of workers, formally organized or not, to have profound repercussions far beyond 
Clermont-Ferrand.  In France and beyond, the attention of the international press continued to 
turn to labor disputes at Michelin, particularly when workers bonded together to bring production 
to a halt.  A report of The New York Times in July 1983 detailed the actions of a Michelin factory 
strike in Stroke-on-Trent, England.  Thatcher had just won the general election in a landslide 
victory the month prior, reinforcing the strength of the Conservative Party.  The article reported 
on two issues concerning the Stroke-on-Trent factory.  First, it included an announcement made 
by Michelin the day prior that they had laid off 2000 workers.  Additionally, the article stated 
that production at the factory had been halted because of a strike 1000 workers strong over a new 
proposal of weekend work.147  This report illustrated not only the fragile state of labor in the UK, 
but also how the stability of labor was a concern for the increasingly globalized industrial world.  
While removed from both the activity of Michelin in France and in North America, this instance 
in England reported on in North America revealed how questions of labor disruptions in Europe 
and across the globe were of interest to an increasingly international audience.  In the context of 
global recession in the early 1980s, labor unrest at Michelin impacted not only Michelin’s 
operations elsewhere but also the global economy as a whole.  
As Michelin continued to expand overseas, they remained troubled by corporate 
relationships with labor.  One way this continuity came to the forefront was in the opening of a 
new factory in Greenville, South Carolina in 1975.  At this new South Carolina factory Michelin 
worked hard to counter its image of a corporation plagued by labor disputes.  As they established 
this new operation in North America, a New York Times report illustrated that, as in Europe, 
Michelin tried to prevent labor organization.  The article discussed how the United Rubber 
                                                
147 “Michelin Acts in Strike,” The New York Times, July 12, 1983, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/122145041?accountid=8505.  
 73 
Workers Union would like to unionize Michelin as well.  It quoted Yves Treliu, executive vice 
president of the Michelin Tire Corporation, saying that, “The only companies that get unionized 
are those that deserve it.”148  Quoting a Michelin executive making such a statement suggested 
that Michelin did not believe it merited the disruption associated with labor organization.  
Furthermore, Mr. Treliu’s statement implied that Michelin did not wish to recreate in North 
America the same difficulties it had faced with unions in Europe.  In addition to the general 
decline of the labor in the United States after the 1950s, strikes in the United States were losing 
their effectiveness as companies increasingly threatened to shut the factory down or to move to a 
new location with lower labor costs.149  Even in a new context, in this instance the United States, 
focus on Michelin drew upon a publicized history of labor at the firm.  
 
Corporate Continuities  
As Michelin evolved over the second half of the twentieth century, it maintained an 
identity that was both remarkably similar to its origins as a family manufacturing business and 
characterized by its relationship with labor.  In looking at discussion of the corporate behavior of 
Michelin after the war, two continuities come to light—the firm’s sense of secrecy vis-à-vis the 
outside world and its paternalism.  While the company has faced many external pressures over its 
125-plus years, the lasting presence of these two corporate behaviors speak to a persistent 
corporate identity.   
Corporate criticism of Michelin for being secretive stems from their actions during the 
war and immediately after, and is in many ways a contradictory source of critique.  Although 
Michelin delivered rubber products to the Germans throughout the war, they were notoriously 
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secretive in their actions.  Allegedly Michelin never allowed German authorities to enter their 
factory.150  This hidden behavior at Michelin did not only apply to the Germans.  It spoke to 
concerted efforts on Michelin’s behalf to keep their operations a secret to all those on the 
outside, even the head of the French government.  When Charles de Gaulle made an official visit 
to Clermont-Ferrand on June 30, 1945 he was kept outside the factory gates.151  Years later, an 
executive commented on de Gaulle’s visit saying, “No one visits our plants.”152  While 
Michelin’s secrecy has been a continued source of criticism, it once again draws upon corporate 
behavior that allowed for the survival of many during the war, yet seemingly had no place in an 
evolving corporate landscape.   
Specifically, bringing into question Michelin’s secrecy questioned the company’s ability 
to modernize and be a player in an evolving economy, in the case of Europe, a more centralized 
European economy.  One report from the New York Times in October 1972 questioned 
Michelin’s lasting corporate behavior in light of movements towards a more centralized 
European economy.  The article described Michelin as “the secretive, technically brilliant, 
paternalistic French enterprise.”153  Specifically, the article contextualized actions of Michelin 
amidst changes taking place in Europe before the entry of Great Britain into the European 
Common market the coming January.  This report recognized Michelin’s past behavior as 
secretive and paternalistic, terms that gave an impression of a company having difficulties 
modernizing.  Above all, this report recognized Michelin’s past history as a secretive company, 
however it did not state specific instances of this behavior such as their activity during the war.  
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Other reports questioned Michelin’s secretive behavior affecting their ability to modernize.  One 
article reported that Michelin had finally agreed to sit down with union leadership in an article 
titled “Secretive Michelin to Discuss its Plans with Unions.”  The article disclosed information 
about Michelin in a way that again questioned their ability to work with labor to modernize their 
operations, in this specific instance modernizing operations in Italy.154  As such reports 
questioned Michelin’s longevity because of their secrecy, it was ironic because it was the same 
activity that allowed for their survival during the war.  
A New York Times report on Michelin and its influence in Clermont-Ferrand detailed one 
worker, Albert Pissis, and his relationship with his employer.  Mr. Pissis, the article’s chosen 
example of an average worker, was never part of a union.155  Details of Mr. Pissis’s life 
illustrated the continued paternalism of Michelin in Clermont-Ferrand.  The article claimed that 
he has never joined a union because “Michelin frowns on such activities.”  He lived in housing 
built by Michelin.156  While this article did not have anything particularly negative to say about 
Michelin, the picture it painted of the company was one rooted in a past, paternalistic vision.  To 
sum up his life, Mr. Pissis stated that his life revolves around “telly, bistro, dodo [the French 
vernacular for sleep] and Michelin.”157  Above all, this glimpse of life at Michelin suggested that 
they were stuck in the past, even given their role in the postwar economic prosperity of France.  
As the article gave the impression that this employee’s entire life was Michelin, it lead the reader 
to believe that Michelin’s corporate practices correlated with those of a bygone era, behavior that 
had no place at the modern multinational corporation Michelin is claiming to be.  As the author 
did not include discussion of labor at Michelin, it differed from many other glimpses into life at 
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Michelin.  In this way, the article was carefully constructed to reinforce management’s vehement 
opposition to labor organization.  While this narrative of life at Michelin did not draw upon past 
a history of of organized labor at the company, it did speak to how Michelin had long frowned 
upon labor organization.  
Even though paternalism at Michelin often evoked negative connotations, Michelin 
continued to implement paternalistic programs for its employees in their overseas operations.  
When Michelin opened their South Carolina factory in 1975 they brought with them many 
corporate practices long associated with their firm.  A few years after opening, a New York Times 
article compared the relationship between labor and management at Michelin to other employers 
in the region.  The article clearly presented Michelin’s goal of avoiding union organization at 
their Greenville, South Carolina factory.  The report detailed “fringe benefits” awarded to 
Michelin workers which included discounted work shoes, inexpensive tires, and a pharmacy card 
which awarded a discount on medication.  Additionally, Michelin implemented an activity 
association for its employees which sought to encourage “leisure-time activities” such as fishing, 
tennis, hiking, camping, and even cooking lessons.158  The benefits awarded to Michelin 
employees in Greenville was a clear continuity of the social programs the company established 
in France at the beginning of the twentieth century.  In Clermont-Ferrand, Michelin provided 
discounted housing and material goods to workers and their families.  Beyond these benefits, 
there was another comparison to be made with the discounted tires available for employees in 
Greenville, specifically in comparison to Michelin’s activity during the war.  Throughout the 
war, workers at Michelin benefitted from a certain level of protections not available elsewhere.  
One benefit was that Michelin gave out tires to its workers in Clermont-Ferrand, which allowed 
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them to trade the valuable tires on the black market.159  In this regard, Michelin’s operations in 
Greenville spoke to their continuity even in the context of global expansion.  In this way, 
Michelin continued to apply their own brand of paternalism even as they grew and evolved.   
All of these “fringe benefits” are a clear echo of benefits awarded to workers in 
Clermont-Ferrand before the war.  While Michelin directors of the late 1930s were clearly 
shocked by union activity at their firm as they thought they had avoided such organization 
through their social programs, moving forward social programs remained an incentive to prevent 
workers from unionizing.  In terms of Michelin’s North American operations in South Carolina, 
it was much more difficult for workers to unionize in southern states due to state legislation 
unfavorable to unions.160  While this paternalistic practice was more out of place by the 1970s, it 
remained engrained in Michelin company culture, for better or for worse.  In their continued 
critique and expansion overseas, paternalism remained an important part of Michelin’s identity 
throughout the twentieth century.  While the practice brought into question the firm’s ability to 
modernize, it also revealed a defining characteristic of the firm that was central to its relationship 
with labor.  In many ways, it is unclear how labor reacted to the paternalism Michelin imposed 
on its workers.  It is clear, however, that labor remained fueled to act in spite of the protections 
Michelin thought it was providing.  
  
                                                
159 Lamy, “Autour de Michelin: Mémoires,” 297. 
160 Jeff Bennett, “Tire Makers’ New Home,” The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2012, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1000437055?accountid=8505.  
 78 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Michelin’s lasting presence from its modest family origins in the early nineteenth century 
to the industrial giant it is known as today highlights the relative strength of the firm.  Viewed 
alongside the tragedies and disruptions France experienced in early to mid twentieth century, 
Michelin’s endurance acknowledges its special place in contemporary French life.  In moments 
when French life has been ripped apart at the seams, Michelin has withstood social, political, and 
economic threats to its very existence.  In this way, Michelin occupies a special place in 
contemporary French history.  While political moments have come to pass and labor moments 
have come to be viewed as products of their time, Michelin has stood resolutely.   
While the focus of my thesis and its interest in French corporate and labor history has 
looked specifically Michelin, the story of French corporations and labor in the twentieth century 
is much larger.  Based off of the little I know, there are comparisons to be made between 
Michelin and Renault in their relationships with labor, manufacturing, and collaboration during 
the war.  Additionally, the family focus of Michelin brings to mind the corporate structure of 
L’Oréal.  My point here is that the particularities of French corporate and labor history for the 
time period I examined in this thesis are not limited to Michelin.     
When studying Michelin, their labor, and the global economy, it is important to note that, 
although the company’s paternalism endured in France and overseas, it did not silence labor.  
The relationship between labor and management at Michelin demonstrates defining 
characteristics of the firm which, although engrained in past recollections of Michelin, have 
continued to define the company into the present.  One can see the clear continuities of both 
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labor and management in Michelin’s development of its own brand of paternalism and in labor’s 
frequent refusal.  
As we have seen since the 1930s, Michelin’s paternalistic identity has continued to raise 
questions of its ability to modernize, particularly in the context of the increasingly connected 
global economy.  One can see this continued critique in a May 2001 article in the Wall Street 
Journal that discusses recent efforts to modernize and the leadership of a new Michelin family 
member at the firm.  The article begins by stating that “When Édouard Michelin took the wheel 
at his family’s tire business in June 1999, he may have underestimated what it would take to 
shake up the secretive, tradition-bound company.”161  This perception of Michelin draws upon an 
understanding of Michelin as a paternalistic company, using this adjective as a way of 
questioning the company’s ability to move into the 21st century.  Just as past discussions of 
Michelin’s actions have criticized the long-term direction of the firm, this article from 2001 
continues that understanding of life at Michelin, suggesting that the corporation must change to 
be a player in the modern world.   
Aside from its continued critique, the article does contain a kernel of hope, however.  The 
author states that Michelin has recently opened its doors to analysts so that shareholders can have 
a better understanding of what Michelin really is.162  As Michelin has long prioritized its privacy, 
this opening to the outside world is a possible sign of change for the firm.  Increased 
transparency in Michelin’s operations signals the firm moving away from the closed sense of 
paternalism that has long-defined the manufacturer.  A sign perhaps that its attitude towards 
warding off organized labor is changing.  Moreover, Michelin is no longer a family business. 
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Jean-Dominique Senard, Michelin’s CEO since May 2012 is the first chief executive of the firm 
that is in no way related to the Michelin family.  While his leadership of the company inherently 
represents a shift from the past, it is seen in many ways as a positive one for the firm.  In an 
interview with Les Echos, the French financial newspaper, Senard assured the public that just 
because he is not part of the Michelin family does not mean that he does not share the same 
values as the firm.  Just as innovation at at the firm has allowed it to thrive in trying times such 
as the economic recovery with their invention of the radial tire, Senard views innovation at the 
firm as a characteristic that will continue to carry Michelin forward.163  
Beyond the survival of the company itself, the lasting impression of labor conflict at 
Michelin addresses not only the situation of labor in the twentieth century, but also to labor’s 
relationship to management.  As labor moments dissolved, the question of labor at Michelin 
remained.  In the continuities that developed in labor and management’s ongoing struggle at 
Michelin, the relationship between the two solidified its importance in the larger understanding 
of labor at this time.  Labor at Michelin not only connects to the broader context of labor 
movements in the twentieth century but also its relationship with the corporations it works for in 
the particularities of Michelin’s long history with labor and its own brand of paternalism.        
For France, it is difficult to consider any history that spans the course of the twentieth 
century without addressing the question of the war.  At Michelin, the war was a point of 
interruption in the long-term battle between management and labor as well as a moment in which 
paternalistic behavior continued in spite of outside pressures.  Michelin during the war addresses 
the larger picture of France and the war as the family both experienced tragedy on a deeply 
personal level and grappled with having been associated with a fascist regime.  For Michelin’s 
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lasting history of paternalism, the wartime years reinforced Michelin’s own paternalism as an 
important characteristic of the firm that would continue in the years to come.  
 In spite of its origins in a provincial French manufacturing town, Michelin has grown to 
become a well-recognized global entity.  In this way, its actions have lasting implications to the 
larger global context.  How companies expand abroad, how they implement practices from back 
home, and how their operations relate to one another are all concerns addressed by the story of 
labor and Michelin.  As Michelin, and the world, moved towards a more centralized way of 
doing business, labor’s role remained more important than ever.  
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